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CRIMINAL LAW 
PROFIT-DRIVEN PROSECUTION AND THE 
COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCESS 
 
MAYBELL ROMERO* 
“It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary 
depends upon his not understanding it.”1 
 
Prosecutors are the most powerful organs of the criminal justice 
system, enjoying discretion in decision-making far beyond that of law 
enforcement officials, defense attorneys, and judges.  Perhaps due to this 
exceptional position, contemporary understandings and perceptions of 
criminal prosecutors have tended to be largely positive; evidence of such a 
normative understanding of the prosecutor and its role may be found from a 
variety of sources, from (other) law review articles to pop cultural 
touchstones in television and movies.  The prevailing “prosecutorial norm” 
in the public consciousness embodies 1) a full-time government employee, 
2) who devotes all of their time and professional energies to criminal 
prosecution, and 3) tries to somehow do or affect some vague notion of 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.  
J.D., U.C. Berkeley School of Law, 2006; B.A., Cornell University, 2003.  From 2006 to 
2009, the author was a Deputy County Attorney in Cache County, Utah, and from 2010 to 
2014 also served on a part-time basis as a Deputy County Attorney in Rich County, Utah.  
This paper was presented at a Works-in-Progress session at the J. Reuben Clark Law School 
at Brigham Young University in June 2016; at CrimFest, hosted by Cardozo School of Law 
at Yeshiva University in July 2016; and at the Inland Northwest Scholars Workshop, hosted 
by Gonzaga University School of Law in August 2016.  Thanks to Gordon Smith, Lisa Sun, 
Brigham Daniels, Aaron Nielson, Carissa Hessick, Miriam Baer, Bruce Green, Rebecca 
Roiphe, Laura Appleman, David Pimentel, and to all the participants at the three workshops 
for their valuable feedback and insights. 
1  UPTON SINCLAIR I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR, AND HOW I GOT LICKED 109 (photo. 
reprint 1994) (1935). 
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“justice.”  Such norms, however, are regularly challenged and flouted 
when the prosecutorial function is outsourced.  Although the outsourcing of 
nearly every function of the criminal adjudicative process has attracted 
great attention among scholars and policymakers, a greater critical lens 
must be focused on prosecutors. 
The hazards of prosecutorial outsourcing have largely been neglected 
because existing prosecutorial scholarship focuses on the United States 
Attorney or district attorneys’ offices in large, metropolitan areas.   Not all 
prosecutorial offices are created equal, however.  Cities, towns, and other 
small political subdivisions throughout the country frequently hire 
prosecutors on a part-time basis through a competitive bidding process, 
releasing requests for proposals (RFPs) in an effort to procure bids.  This 
practice, however, may be observed not only in small or rural 
municipalities, but also in cities located near larger population centers. 
Examples of such municipalities include Ferguson, Missouri, and Kyle, 
Texas. Such local governments often work with budgets that are not 
expansive enough to hire a full-time city attorney or prosecutor. Beyond 
demonstrating the qualifications, the applicant attorneys or firms vying for 
a prosecution contract may have to serve as good prosecutors, applications 
from such applicants must also demonstrate cost effectiveness by detailing 
what budget and compensation is required during the term of service 
specified by the RFP. 
Although engaging in a competitive bidding process may seem like a 
smart way to handle the problem of governmental waste and financial 
inefficiencies, it introduces a host of challenges and negative externalities.  
This Article sheds light on the problems caused by introducing an overtly 
economic calculation (how cheaply and how profitably the prosecutorial 
function may be fulfilled) into the criminal adjudicative process.  This 
practice not only flouts American Bar Association and National District 
Attorney Association prosecutorial standards, but also undermines the 
prosecutorial norms described above in ways that are likely to destabilize 
confidence—and the social cohesion born of such confidence—in local 
criminal justice systems. This practice has the risk, however, of expanding 
beyond the reach of non-metropolitan jurisdictions to larger counties, 
cities, and local governments as budgets continue to shrink across the 
board and devolution and privatization continue to be advanced as cure-
alls to economic woes. 
  
1. ROMERO 4/21/2017  2:05 PM 
2017]  PROFIT-DRIVEN PROSECUTION 163 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 163 
I.  THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR’S EVOLVING ROLES .............................. 169 
A.  From Private Actor to Public Servant ...................................... 169 
B.  Prosecutorial Norms ................................................................. 171 
C.  Governance of Prosecutors Under ABA and NDAA 
Standards and ABA Model Rules ........................................... 178 
II.  OUTSOURCING OF PROSECUTORIAL SERVICES ................................... 181 
A.  Spatial Inequality, Dwindling Tax Bases, and Devolution ...... 182 
B.  Defining “Outsourcing” and “Privatization” ............................ 185 
C.  The Competitive Bidding/RFP Process .................................... 187 
D.  Samples of Prosecutorial Outsourcing RFPs Throughout the 
United States ........................................................................... 189 
1.  Green River, Wyoming ...................................................... 189 
2.  Lakeville, Minnesota .......................................................... 190 
3.  River Falls, Wisconsin ....................................................... 190 
4.  Ephraim City, Utah ............................................................ 191 
5.  Kyle, Texas ........................................................................ 192 
6.  Hortonville, Wisconsin ...................................................... 194 
III.  PROSECUTORIAL BIDDING AND OUTSOURCING IS DISTINCTLY 
PROBLEMATIC ................................................................................ 195 
A.  The Dangers of Bidding: Self-Dealing and Self-Interest ......... 197 
B.  The Dangers of Bidding: Multiple Principals and Divided   
Loyalties .................................................................................. 200 
C.  The Dangers of Bidding: Blame Shifting and Lack of 
Accountability ......................................................................... 203 
D.  Illusory Problems of Outsourced Prosecution .......................... 205 
E.  Comparisons with Other RFP Processes .................................. 207 
1. Bidding for Prosecutorial Services versus Private 
Prisons ............................................................................... 207 
2. Bidding for Prosecutorial Services vs. Indigent Defense .. 210 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 212 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The shooting death of Michael Brown, an unarmed 18-year-old 
African American man, at the hands of Darren Wilson, a white Ferguson, 
Missouri police officer, prompted not only riots and protests in Ferguson 
and beyond, but also wide-spread debates and soul searching as to the 
nature of American criminal justice, especially focusing on issues such as 
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law enforcement militarization, limits on the use of deadly force, and 
interactions between police and people of color.2 
A little less than a month after Michael Brown’s death, the Civil 
Rights Division of the Department of Justice initiated its own investigation 
of the Ferguson Police Department pursuant to the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the Safe Streets Act, and Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.3  The Department of Justice’s investigation, in a 
subsequent report released on March 4, 2015, catalogued and scrutinized a 
wide array of problematic law enforcement practices perpetrated by the 
Ferguson Police Department against the public.4  One of the practices 
highlighted in the report was the Ferguson Police Department’s stubborn 
focus on generating revenue for the city: “City and police leadership 
pressure officers to write citations, independent of any public safety need, 
and rely on citation productivity to fund the City budget.”5 
In stark contrast to the intense public scrutiny of the profit-motivated 
Ferguson police officers, the role of city prosecutor Stephanie Karr in 
Ferguson’s criminal justice system was largely ignored. The Civil Rights 
Division investigation, however, revealed that she engaged in a pattern of 
 
2  Similar calls for soul-searching have been issued after the untimely deaths of Trayvon 
Martin, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, and, even a generation ago, Latasha Harlins.  See, e.g., 
Susan Crabtree, The Limits of Obama’s Baltimore Soul-Searching, WASH. EXAM’R (Apr. 29, 
2015), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obama-still-soul-searching-on-racial-unrest/
article/2563750; Andrea Ford & Tracy Wilkinson, Grover Is Convicted in Teen Killing: 
Verdict: Jury finds Korean Woman Guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter in the Fatal Shooting 
of a Black Girl, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-12/news/
mn-152_1_voluntary-manslaughter; John Fritze, Obama Calls for ‘Soul Searching’ in the 
Wake of Gray’s Death, BALT. SUN (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-freddie-gray-obama-20150428-story.html. 
3  See Joint Statement of United States Attorney Richard G. Callahan, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General for The Civil Rights Division Molly J. Moran and FBI SAC William P. 
Woods, U.S. Dep’t of Just., United States Attorney’s Office Eastern District of Missouri 
(Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmo/pr/joint-statement-united-states-attor
ney-richard-g-callahan-acting-assistant-attorney; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
ANNOUNCES FINDINGS OF TWO CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI 
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings-two-
civil-rights-investigations-ferguson-missouri. 
4  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, 
MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael
_brown_1.pdf. 
5  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 10 (Mar. 
4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/
04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
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“recommending higher fines [on high volume offenses] and recommending 
probation only infrequently,”6 as well as encouraging police officers to cite 
individuals with every charge possible per incident in an effort to obtain the 
“correct volume of cases” on the Ferguson municipal court docket.7  Karr 
started in the part-time position of City Prosecutor in April 2011.8  At the 
time of this appointment, she was already serving as Ferguson’s city 
attorney, providing representation on civil matters.9 Ms. Karr was hired on 
as the city’s prosecutor by way of contract after a competitive bidding 
process: Missouri state law mandates that such positions, not only at the 
state level, but at the local level as well, be filled through a competitive 
bidding process in which a low-bidder—an attorney or a firm who has 
submitted the bid with the lowest cost—is automatically awarded the 
contract.10 Given this statute, Ferguson has historically “contract[ed] for 
legal services, so it [issued] a [new] request for proposals on June 1[, 
2016].”11 
For other counties, cities, towns, and local governments of similar size, 
hiring a full-time prosecutor or district attorney is often cost-prohibitive, if 
not impossible, given scarce financial resources.12  In cities like Ferguson, 
which are generally too small to justify hiring a full-time district attorney, a 
 
6  Id. at 14–15. The Department of Justice’s report discussed the pressures upon the 
Ferguson City Prosecutor to engage in revenue generation: 
Court staff [is] keenly aware that the City considers revenue generation to be the municipal 
court’s primary purpose.  Revenue targets for court fines and fees are created in consultation not 
only with [the police chief], but also the Court Clerk.  In one April 2010 exchange with [the 
police chief] entitled “2011 Budget,” for example, the Finance Director sought and received 
confirmation that the Police Chief and Court Clerk would prepare targets for the court’s fine and 
fee collections for subsequent years.  Court [S]taff take steps to ensure those targets are met in 
operating court.  For example, in April 2011, the Court Clerk wrote to Judge Brockmeyer 
(copying [the police chief]) that the fines the new Prosecuting Attorney was recommending were 
not high enough.  The Clerk highlighted one case involving three Derelict Vehicle charges and a 
Failure to Comply charge that resulted in $76 in fines, and noted this “normally would have 
brought a fine of all three charges around $400.”  After describing another case that she believed 
warranted higher fines, the Clerk concluded: “We need to keep up our revenue.”  There is no 
indication that ability to pay or public safety goals were considered. 
Id. 
7  Id. at 11. 
8  Complaint at 6, United States v. Ferguson, (E.D. Mo. 2016) (No. 4:16-cv-00180). 
9  Id. 
10  MO. REV. STAT. § 105.458.2(1) (1998). Such requirements may be waived if the 
amount to be paid for the service is less than $5,000 a year. 
11  Fiona Ortiz, Ferguson Attorney Steps Down After Criticism, REUTERS (May 24, 
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-missouri-ferguson-idUSKCN0YF2NO. 
12  See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private 
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 418 (2009). 
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prosecutor may be appointed to the post, often by a mayor or a city council.  
Candidates for such outsourced prosecution positions are often required to 
go through a competitive bidding process in which cost-savings, fine 
generation, and outbidding competitors are prioritized over other evaluative 
concerns, submitting a bid in response to a request for proposal (RFP) 
issued by the jurisdiction in question.13 
The prosecutors hired pursuant to this method of outsourcing the 
prosecutorial function have little in common with the popular cultural 
conception of district attorneys and other criminal prosecutors in the United 
States.  In the popular imagination, a prosecutor is a practitioner who has 
been elected to the position, who leads an office in an attempt to seek 
justice on behalf of either “the People” or “the State.”  Pop culture is rife 
with such examples, ranging from the ADAs of Law and Order to the 
bumbling yet consistently honest Hamilton Burger of Perry Mason, who 
(with his extraordinarily bad record at trial) described his work as requiring 
him merely to “do justice, and justice is served when a guilty man is 
convicted and when an innocent man is not.”14 
Outsourcing prosecution through RFPs also creates serious tensions 
with the professional standards that bind prosecutors. For example, the 
American Bar Association has promulgated prosecution function standards 
“to be used as a guide to professional conduct and performance.”15  Under 
these standards the “duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to 
convict.”16  It is also incumbent upon the prosecutor to “seek to reform and 
improve the administration of criminal justice.”17  The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which have been adopted in whole or part by all 50 
states,18 also bear upon the ethical obligations that are incumbent upon 
 
13  See infra Section II.C. 
14  Perry Mason: The Case of the Deadly Verdict (CBS television broadcast Oct. 3, 
1963); see also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (statement of Judge Sotomayor (2009) quoting Hamilton 
Burger).  Justice Sotomayor also discussed her fondness and admiration for Hamilton Burger 
in her autobiography: “I liked that he was a good loser, that he was more committed to 
finding the truth than to winning his case.”  SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 101 
(2013). 
15  CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.1 (AM. 
BAR. ASS’N 2015) [hereinafter “ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS”]. 
16  Id. at Standard 3-1.2(b). 
17  Id. at Standard 3-1.2(f). 
18  AM. BAR ASS’N, Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profession
al_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited July 31, 2016). 
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prosecutors.19  The National District Attorneys Association has similarly 
promulgated its own ethical standards for prosecutors, which are more 
detailed than those from the ABA.20 
While it helps to examine the issues raised as a result of relying on 
outsourced prosecutors through the lenses of formulaic rules—seen by 
many who practice law as the only requirements necessary to consider 
when reflecting on their own comportment—this Article endeavors to hold 
our nation’s prosecutors, especially local prosecutors, to the higher 
standards that are popularly expected of them by the public, and that the 
need for accountability and justice demand. While “[e]fficiency gains are 
the major reason that governments enter into privatization agreements,”21 
the use of outsourced prosecution services, particularly those hired through 
an RFP or competitive bidding process is dangerous, subjecting the hired 
prosecutors to much of the same political pressure as elected officials while 
also generating unusual and significant pressures to prioritize budgets and 
fine or fee generation.22 
Even in the recent years during which criminal justice system reform 
has been discussed by both political liberals and conservatives alike, there 
is still a general belief that wrongfully prevails—that local prosecutors are 
elected.23  A piece published by The Atlantic stated that “[i]n all but four 
states, prosecutors are elected to office—about 2,400 of them[.]”24  In his 
recent address to the Democratic National Convention, President Barack 
Obama exhorted voters that if they “want more justice in the justice system, 
then we’ve all got to vote—not just for a president, but for mayors, and 
sheriffs, and state’s attorneys, and state legislators.  That’s where the 
criminal law is made.”25 While helpful to those who have long been 
 
19  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (2016). 
20  NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (3d ed. 2009), 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentar
y.pdf. 
21  Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private 
Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2226–28 (2013). 
22  See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits 
of Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265 (2010). 
23  JOHN M. SCHEB, II, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27 (7th ed. 2014); Mirjan Damaska, 
Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 512 (1975). 
24  Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Are Prosecutors the Key to Justice Reform?, THE 
ATLANTIC (May 18, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/are-prose
cutors-the-key-to-justice-reform/483252/. 
25  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Democratic National 
Convention (July 27, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07
/28/remarks-president-democratic-national-convention. 
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advocating for greater focus on local criminal justice system reform, both 
statements exhibit a long-standing lack of knowledge regarding the criminal 
justice system on a much more local level than that of federal or state 
government: Not all prosecutors are elected.26 
This Article builds on the work of Professor Roger Fairfax, who has 
previously studied the ills that arise from varying methods of outsourcing 
the prosecutor’s role to private actors, providing useful general overviews.27 
This Article, however, examines and highlights the particular risks inherent 
in hiring prosecutors through RFPs.  It identifies the specific incentives, 
both personal and institutional, that arise in smaller, often rural but also 
suburban and urban, jurisdictions throughout the country when prosecutors 
are procured by way of RFPs, which tend to focus the prosecutor’s attention 
on efficiency and revenue generation, rather than justice—a focus 
compounded by the relatively short-term nature of many outsourcing 
contracts and the concomitant need for the prosecutor to reapply (and 
demonstrate cost-effectiveness) on a regular basis.28 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the history of the 
American prosecutor’s role by focusing on scope of work as well as 
historical methods of compensation, demonstrating that the prosecutorial 
role of a full-time public servant paid on a salary basis arose for a number 
of reasons.  It also details the evolution of these norms from a pop culture 
perspective as well as that from the more formalized, yet mainly 
aspirational, rules outlined in both American Bar Association and National 
District Attorney Association Standards. 
Part II describes the outsourcing of prosecution generally, with Part 
II.A examining the challenges that may force local governments to 
outsource their criminal prosecutors.  Part II.B provides more background 
on the concepts of outsourcing and privatization, while Part II.C introduces 
the RFP and competitive bidding process.  Part II.D analyzes the RFP 
language from a small selection of local governments from around the 
nation, highlighting language that creates greater pressure and incentives for 
prosecutors not only to save costs but also to generate revenue. 
Part III examines multiple incentives and disincentives both on the part 
of an individual prosecutor as well as local government councils, mayors, 
 
26  Christina Santos, Comment, An Analysis of Austin Lawyers Guild v. Securus 
Technologies, Inc.: The Constitutional and Ethical Implications of Using Illegally Recorded 
Attorney-Client Telephone Conversations as Derivative Evidence, 6 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 304, 329 n.139 (2016). 
27  See generally Fairfax, Jr., supra note 22. See also Fairfax, Jr., supra note 12, at 416. 
28  See Frederick C. Thayer, Regulation is Inevitable: Legal Planning or Illegal 
Collusion?, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 425, 443 (1983). 
1. ROMERO 4/21/2017  2:05 PM 
2017]  PROFIT-DRIVEN PROSECUTION 169 
and executives to concern themselves with their bottom lines rather than 
providing services focused on providing justice to the public.  Part III also 
demonstrates that prosecutorial outsourcing by way of RFP is substantially 
different and uniquely problematic compared to procurement for other 
services or goods, as doing so amounts to selling the concept of “justice” to 
the lowest bidder.  
I.  THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR’S EVOLVING ROLES 
A.  FROM PRIVATE ACTOR TO PUBLIC SERVANT 
Although the usual norms characterizing a criminal prosecutor most 
often encompass in the public consciousness, a full-time government 
attorney elected directly by the people of a particular political subdivision, 
such a norm is unique to the United States and is of recent invention.29  
Criminal prosecution processes in the colonies quickly came to diverge 
from those in England, where victims themselves funded prosecutions by 
hiring their own attorneys.30  Due to Dutch influence—for example, the 
position of “attorney general” was introduced in a Dutch colony in 168631—
public prosecutors with varying titles such as “state’s attorney,” “district 
attorney,” “county attorney,” and “attorney general” proliferated; thus, 
public prosecutors came to dominate American criminal justice systems far 
ahead of any English counterparts.32  These prosecutorial positions were 
initially filled by appointment,33 as were many other positions in state and 
local government, with great variance from state to state as to who 
exercised this power of appointment.34 
American criminal prosecutors were also not originally full-time 
government employees, given that criminal prosecutions had originally 
been victim-funded, but usually took such positions to supplement income 
from private practices or other business ventures.35  As such, attorneys 
 
29  Michael J. Ellis, Note, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 Yale L.J. 1528, 
1530 (2012) (“The United States is the only country in the world where citizens elect 
prosecutors.”). 
30  The Crown Prosecution Service, History, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20070205205701/http:/www.cps.gov.uk/about/history.html (last visited June 16, 2016). 
31  GWLADYS GILLIÉRON, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 43 
(2014). 
32  Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the Nineteenth-Century 
United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 43 (1995). 
33  Ellis, supra note 29. 
34  Id. at 1537. 
35  Id. at 1539. 
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employed as public prosecutors were often “young, inexperienced attorneys 
or older, generally incompetent ones.”36  Prosecutorial budgets in the early 
republic were often anemic, resulting in complaints of overwork for too 
little pay.37  Talented, experienced criminal law attorneys, therefore, were 
disincentivized from considering such work, choosing to work as either 
defense counsel or private prosecutors hired by victims.38 
Andrew Jackson’s assumption of the presidency in 1829 began a 
period of rampant political patronage and reward, also widely known today 
as the “spoils system”39 in which government jobs and positions were doled 
out to friends and family for their support.40 Although rewarding loyal 
supporters with posts and positions had certainly been done before, 
Jackson’s presidency ushered in a period of American politics in which the 
system of political patronage reached a never-before seen zenith.41 As 
explained by the late Professor Merrill D. Peterson, 
Abuse of the patronage power had been the first public outcry against the [Jackson] 
administration. Patronage was a partisan issue, but it assumed theoretical significance 
when Jackson himself extended the old idea of “rotation in office,” applicable to 
elected officials, to appointive officials . . . and, reasoning that because office is not “a 
species of property,” therefore removals for political cause were perfectly 
appropriate.42 
 
36  Ireland, supra note 32, at 43. 
37  Id. at 44–45. 
38  Id. at 45 (citation omitted). 
One of Kentucky’s more able prosecutors admitted in 1879 that in his district it was “almost 
impossible to get anyone to take office. . . .”  In the same year, a Kentucky federal district judge 
remarked that “in almost every criminal trial in this state there is on the side of the Government 
youth and inexperience . . . whilst on behalf of the accused is arrayed all the learning . . . 
experience, and . . . talent.” 
Id. 
39  University of Virginia Miller Center, Andrew Jackson: Domestic Affairs, http://miller
center.org/president/biography/jackson-domestic-affairs (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
40  The name of the “spoils” system is derived from remarks by William Macy, who was 
criticizing the political patronage rampant in Jackson’s administration, stating: 
It may be, sir that the politicians of the United States are not so fastidious as some gentlemen are, 
as to disclosing the principles on which they act. They boldly preach what they practice. When 
they are contending for victory, they avow their intention of enjoying the fruits of it. If they are 
defeated, they expect to retire from office. If they are successful, they claim, as a matter of right, 
the advantages of success. They see nothing wrong in the rule, that to the victor belong the spoils 
of the enemy. 
8 Reg. Deb. 1325 (1832) (remarks of Sen. Macy). 
41  Note, The Ineligibility Clause’s Lost History: Presidential Patronage and Congress, 
1787-1850, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1742 (2010). 
42  MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND CALHOUN 
253 (1987). 
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An unprecedented number of public offices were filled through this system 
of patronage, including prosecutors and other government attorneys.43 In 
reaction to this system, a greater public support for popular election of 
district attorneys and prosecutors took hold; “electing prosecutors also 
allowed communities to maintain control over the functions of local 
government.”44 By 1877, every state had adopted the use of elected 
prosecutors at one level or the other, as would every other state admitted to 
the Union thereon.45 
Simply because every state adopted some form of the elected 
prosecutor—either at the state attorney general level or district or county 
attorney level—however, does not mean that all positions handling criminal 
prosecutions were elected.  Particularly in small, rural jurisdictions (cities, 
towns, counties, etc.) that neither had the budget to pay a full-time criminal 
prosecutor much in the same way that many jurisdictions did in the early 
days of the Republic, nor the population to make an election a practical 
option due to a lack of attorneys, alternatives to the public election of 
prosecutors have persisted.46  These mainly break down into three models: 
1) the part-time prosecutor model, under which attorneys are elected to 
serve on a part-time basis while also allowed to engage in a private law 
practice or other venture47; 2) victim retained prosecution48; and 3) the 
prosecution outsourcing model49 (hereinafter the “outsourcing model,” or 
“outsourcing”), under which local governments contract with law firms or 
individual attorneys for (usually part-time) prosecutorial services for a term 
of years.  Attorneys operating under the third model—an outsourcing 
model—are often selected after responding to posted requests for 
proposals.50 
B.  PROSECUTORIAL NORMS 
The widely accepted norm that prosecutors should not be influenced 
 
43  Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the Government as 
a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 787 (1991). 
44  Ellis, supra note 29, at 1558. 
45  Id. at 1568–69. 
46  Fairfax, supra note 22, at 280–81. 
  47  Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Toward Resolving Prosecutor 
Conflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 420–27 (1993). 
48  DAVID W. NEUBAUER & HENRY F. FRADELLA, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 154 (1979).  Some states still allow for victims to hire and fund their own 
prosecutors. 
49  See generally Fairfax, supra note 22. 
50  Fairfax, Jr., supra note 12, at 416–17. 
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by concerns apart from serving the public’s interest arose in the United 
States much earlier than in the United Kingdom. For example, in 
Commonwealth v. Knapp,51 both the attorney-general and solicitor-general 
of Massachusetts were working together to prosecute a murder.52  The 
attorney-general sought to have a private prosecutor appointed to the 
prosecution team to assist in the case.53  On appeal, Knapp argued that 
pursuant to Massachusetts’s statute delineating the roles of prosecutors at 
the time, any prosecutor engaged in private practice should not have been 
allowed to assist in the case.54  The Knapp court stated: 
In cases where civil rights are in controversy and the form of proceeding is by 
indictment or information, the Court do[es] not perceive any objection against 
permitting the party in interest to employ counsel in aid of the law officers.  The same 
reasons would not apply to cases involving public considerations only.  In such cases 
the statute supposes that the prosecution will be conducted by the law officers, for 
their salaries, and without any other compensation whatever. . . . [T]his case presents 
the question, whether a counsellor may, at the request of the attorney-general, be 
admitted to aid him in the prosecution, without any pecuniary consideration being 
paid to him, or any other consideration which may be supposed to influence him, 
excepting a disinterested regard for the public good.55 
Here, when considering the policy implications of private sector attorneys’ 
help on prosecutorial criminal matters, the Knapp court made an important 
and early distinction between cases in which there was a discernable “party 
of interest,” such as a victim, versus cases that involved a larger injury to 
“the public good.”56 
A multitude of other states addressed the further question of whether 
attorneys engaged in private practice should be allowed to handle criminal 
 
51  Commonwealth v. Knapp, 27 Mass. 477 (1830). 
52  Id. at 490. 
53  Id. at 489. 
54  Id. at 489. Mass. St. 1807, c. 18, required county attorneys to act on behalf of the state 
“provided, that the attorney-general, when present, and, in his absence, the solicitor-general, 
if present, shall, in any court, have the direction and control of prosecutions and suits [o]n 
behalf of the Commonwealth.” Id. It also provided that “no attorney-general, solicitor-
general or county-attorney shall receive and fee or reward from or in behalf of any 
prosecutor, for services in any prosecution, to which it shall be his official duty to attend.” 
Id. The appellant operated under the assumption that the attorney that the Commonwealth 
sought to appoint was being privately compensated; the attorney in question, however, 
explained that he was not working for any pecuniary inducement at all. Id. at 491. 
55  Id. at 490–91. 
56  Id. at 491. The Knapp court held that the private prosecutor who assisted the attorney 
general should have been allowed to do so as 1) he did so at the attorney-general’s request 
for the murder case alone and 2) the private prosecutor was doing the work pro bono.  Id. at 
487. 
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actions on behalf of certain jurisdictions, and many of these cases were 
heard by state supreme courts throughout the 1800s.57 For example, the 
Michigan Supreme Court held that that appointment of an additional 
prosecutor during the pendency of a forgery case was permissible given that 
this attorney “was not employed by any private party, that he had no 
interest in the matter, that he was associated in business with the 
prosecuting officer, and had attended the prosecution on behalf of the 
people in the justice’s court.”58  Such cases present the early formation of a 
normative standard that prosecutors are expected to meet—that they should 
somehow be shielded from external or private interests and should only 
concern themselves with the public good and with the fair administration of 
justice rather than deal with the external pressures that come from running 
separate legal practices.59 
While meeting such ethical expectations would initially appear to 
create additional burdens upon prosecutors, prosecutors have attempted to 
use these higher standards to their tactical advantage, suggesting that they 
should be afforded greater deference. For example, prosecutors have 
variously argued their greater trustworthiness in comparison to other actors 
in the criminal justice system, such as defendants or defense attorneys, or 
have pressed for troublingly expansive roles.60  In oral argument for 
Miranda v. Arizona, Gary K. Nelson, assistant Arizona attorney general, 
attempted to bolster the state’s argument (that allowing for counsel at 
 
57  Ireland, supra note 32, at 49 (“By the end of the nineteenth century, the high tribunals 
of Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia had upheld the legality of 
privately funded prosecutors.”). 
58  People v. Foote, 93 Mich. 38, 39–40 (1892). 
59  The prosecutor’s position was conceived as “one involving a duty of impartiality not 
altogether unlike that of the judge himself.” Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99, 104 (1875); see 
also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Speaking in the context of federal 
prosecutions: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but a 
sovereign whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at 
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, 
the twofold aim of which is that guilt should not escape or innocence suffers.  He may prosecute 
with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so.  But while he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about 
a just one. 
Id. 
60  Professor Bruce Green noted a similar point in his article Why Should Prosecutors 
“Seek Justice”? Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 607, 614–15 (1999). 
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interrogations would unduly hamper investigative efforts) by relying on the 
prosecutor’s perceived duty to do justice: 
Our adversary system as such is not completely adversary even at the trial state in a 
criminal prosecution because Canon Five of the Canons of Ethics61 of the American 
Bar Association which are law in Arizona by rule of court says that the duty of the 
prosecution is not simply to go out and convict but is to see that justice is done. 
I know, I’ve talked to many prosecutors myself in my short time, I’ve gotten as much 
satisfaction out of the cases when I – which I was compelled to confess error in a case 
where a man has been deprived of his rights by due process that I’ve gotten 
satisfaction in being upheld in a tight case in court.62 
Prosecutors have also, for example, attempted to leverage high ethical 
expectations when vouching improperly for themselves,63 witnesses,64 or 
even a combination thereof.65 The heightened duty placed upon prosecutors 
 
61  Canon 5 of the original ABA Canons of Professional Ethics stated that with respect to 
the prosecution function, “[t]he primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is 
not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of 
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible.” 
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 5 (1908). The language regarding the suppression 
of exculpatory evidence is very much outdated since Brady mandated the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
62  Oral Argument at 55:37, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), https://
www.oyez.org/cases/1965/759. 
63  Prosecutors vouch improperly for themselves or witnesses when they “place[] the 
prestige of [his or her] office behind the government’s case by, for example, imparting 
[their] personal belief in a witness’s veracity or implying that the jury should credit the 
prosecution’s evidence simply because the government can be trusted.”  United States v. 
Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing U.S. v. Figueroa-Encarnación, 343 F.3d 23, 
28 (1st Cir. 2003)).  For an additional example of a prosecutor improperly vouching for 
themselves, see, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363, 373 n.22 (D.C. 2009) in which 
a prosecutor attempted to bolster the government’s case by emphasizing the first 
prosecutor’s ethical duties: 
At another point the prosecutor asked: 
Prosecutor: In fact, [the first prosecutor] told you that the last thing he wanted to do was to 
have the wrong person in jail; isn’t that right? 
[Witness]: He told me that but I didn’t believe him . . . . 
Id. 
64  See, e.g., Greenberg v. United States, 280 F.2d 472, 475 (1st Cir. 1960). 
To permit counsel to express his personal belief in the testimony (even if not phrased so as to 
suggest knowledge of additional evidence not known to the jury), would afford him a privilege 
not even accorded to witnesses under oath and subject to cross-examination.  Worse, it creates 
the false issue of the reliability and credibility of counsel.  This is peculiarly unfortunate if one of 
them has the advantage of official backing. 
Id. 
65  See, e.g., United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting statements made by the prosecutor at trial in which the prosecutor offered improper 
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to do justice may function as an additional advantage the government can 
wield against defendants, often paired with greater material resources as 
well as the assistance of law enforcement. 
Pop cultural representations of prosecutors are also illustrative of 
prevailing prosecutorial norms both past and present (as well as other social 
mores, customs, and beliefs).66  There still is, of course, a great deal of 
debate as to what extent pop culture instigates change on its own, a question 
which this Article will not attempt to address or answer but which cognitive 
psychologists have addressed extensively through the formulation and 
debate surrounding cultivation theory.67 
In the first decades of the 1900s, as prosecutors began to take on a 
more central and powerful role in the criminal justice system,68 they also 
began to take on a greater pop cultural role.  In the 1930s, prosecutors 
joining police in the fight against organized crime also boosted the prestige 
and visibility of the job throughout the nation.69  This new spotlight helped 
inspire the proliferation of fictitious prosecutor and district attorney roles in 
popular media.70 A fascinating example of an early fictitious district 
attorney can be found in the 1940s radio drama Mr. District Attorney, 
which Professor David Ray Papke noted was generally “free of complexity, 
and character motivation and the conflict between lawbreakers and law 
enforcement are easy to understand.”71 Mr. District Attorney, who 
otherwise was nameless for the majority of the show’s many years on the 
 
statements at trial, vouching for himself and law enforcement by referring to the prestige and 
veracity of the government). 
66  MICHAEL ASIMOW & SHARON MADER, LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 153–80 (2004). 
67  Cultivation theory examines the interaction between media and society, specifically 
operating as 
“a theory of media’s role in social control.  That is, it examines how media are used in social 
systems to build consensus . . . on positions through shared terms of discourse and assumptions 
about priorities and values.” . . . Crucially, cultivation theory assumes that, since mass media is 
produced by cultural elites in a commercial system, “the system works so as to benefit social 
elites.” 
Cynthia D. Bond, We, the Judges: The Legalized Subject and Narratives of Adjudication in 
Reality Television, 81 UMKC L. REV. 1, 16 (2012) (quoting JAMES SHANAHAN & MICHAEL 
MORGAN, TELEVISION AND ITS VIEWERS: CULTIVATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 15 (1999)). 
68  See Allen Steinberg, The “Lawman” in New York: William Travers Jerome and the 
Origins of the Modern District Attorney in Turn-of-the-Century New York, 34 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 753, 753 (2003). 
69  Id. at 755. 
70  David Ray Papke, Mr. District Attorney: The Prosecutor During the Golden Age of 
Radio, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 781, 782 (2003). 
71  Id. at 788. 
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air, was depicted as “honest, brave, and devoted to his work.”72  The show’s 
opening lines, intoned by the show’s announcer (known as the “Voice of 
the Law”) proclaimed that Mr. District Attorney was the “[c]hampion of the 
people, defender of truth, guardian of our fundamental rights—life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness.”73 
Such opening lines may strike today’s listeners as simultaneously 
quixotic, wooden, and misleading—they are not, however, much different 
than those uttered in the opening scenes of every episode of the longest-
running crime drama in the United States, Law & Order: “In the criminal 
justice system, the people are represented by two separate, yet equally 
important groups: The police who investigate crime and the District 
Attorneys who prosecute the offenders.”74 The contrast between this public 
perception of prosecutors and the public perception of defense attorneys is 
telling.  While prosecutors hold a greater position of trust and authority not 
only in pop culture but also their communities, defense lawyers conversely 
“generally toil amid a culture of scorn” and “are often perceived as amoral 
gunslingers who thrive on the thrill of beating the system and defending the 
guilty.”75  Comparing state prosecutorial budgets versus indigent defense 
budgets also illustrates the extent to which the prosecution function is 
publicly prioritized over that of Gideon-mandated indigent defense76: in 
2007 the total operating budget of state prosecutors’ offices throughout the 
country was $5.8 billion,77 while states in 2012 only spent $2.3 billion on 
public defense.78 
However, lately there has been a chipping-away, if not crisis, of public 
confidence in the criminal justice system.79  Long-standing features of 
 
72  Id. at 790. 
73  Id. at 781. 
74  Law & Order (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 13, 1990). 
75  Rod Smolla, The Best Defense, SLATE (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/11/the_best_defense.html. 
76  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
77  STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 – STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (2011), http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf.  The 2007 operating budget was a decrease from 
the 2001 total of $6.1 billion (amounting to a 5% decrease). 
78  ERINN HERBERMAN & TRACY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, STATE GOVERNMENT INDIGENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, FY 2008–2012 – UPDATED 
(2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sgide0812.pdf. I rely on the most recent 
statistics from the Bureau of Justice Statistics for both figures on prosecutorial and defense 
spending.  Studies examining both rolls are not usually conducted nor release simultaneously 
nor based on the same years, unfortunately. 
79  As noted by Carolyn B. Ramsey back in 2002, which is still the status quo, 
“[e]mpirical scholarship on the relationship between public opinion and criminal justice has 
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American criminal law and justice, such as the death penalty, have been 
reconsidered in the public consciousness.80  Confidence in prosecutors has 
lately been shaken as well, with notable examples arising from the deaths of 
Michael Brown in Ferguson and Eric Garner in Staten Island.  In both cases 
prosecutors sought indictments before grand juries against police officers 
Darren Wilson and Daniel Pantaleo, respectively, and in both of these cases, 
the prosecutors failed.81  The burden of proof for obtaining a grand jury 
indictment is the exceptionally low probable cause standard82; the laxity of 
this standard was perhaps most familiarly styled by Sol Wachtler in Tom 
Wolfe’s The Bonfire of the Vanities: “[A] grand jury would ‘indict a ham 
sandwich,’ if that’s what you wanted.”83  The inability to secure indictments 
against Wilson and Pantaleo ignited weeks of civil unrest, with many 
alternately doubting the competence or vigilance of the prosecutors 
involved.84 
While there has been a greater recent push toward bipartisan criminal 
justice reform, much of that effort has been focused, understandably, on the 
roles of law enforcement and defense counsel.85 One can, at best, speculate 
 
not focused primarily on prosecutorial ethics.” Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary 
Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1319 
(2002). 
80  See Richard C. Dieter, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., A Crisis in Confidence: Americans’ 
Doubts About the Death Penalty, (2007), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/CoC.pdf. 
81  Erin McClam, Ferguson Cop Darren Wilson Not Indicted in Shooting of Michael 
Brown, NBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2014, 2:21 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-
brown-shooting/ferguson-cop-darren-wilson-not-indicted-shooting-michael-brown-n255391; 
Ray Sanchez & Shimon Prokupecz, Protests After N.Y. Cop Not Indicted in Chokehold 
Death; Feds Reviewing Case, CNN (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/03/justice/
new-york-grand-jury-chokehold/. 
82  Kaley v. U.S., 134 S.Ct. 1090, 1103 (2014) (“Probable cause, we have often told 
litigants, is not a high bar: It requires only the kind of fair probability on which reasonable 
and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
83  TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 603 (1987). 
84  See, e.g., Travis Andersen et al., Thousands Protest Eric Garner Case in Downtown 
Boston, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/12/04/protest-
planned-christmas-tree-lighting-common/875sx4ZA1JcHliKte9UyCJ/story.html; Monica 
Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-
shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html; Brandt Williams, Protests Shut Down Part of I-
35W for Over an Hour, MPR NEWS (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/
12/04/protesters-close-i35w; Editorial Board, A Crisis in Confidence in Prosecutors, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/a-crisis-of-confidence-
in-prosecutors.html?_r=0. 
85  See, e.g., Criminal Law Reform, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-
reform (last visited Oct. 5, 2016); SMU Announces Deason Family Criminal Justice Reform 
Center in Dedman School of Law, SMU.EDU (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.smu.edu/News/
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as to the reasons for those emphases.  Perhaps latent acceptance of the 
prosecutorial norms thus far described has shielded the prosecutorial role 
from the spotlight.  Perhaps prosecutors are so aligned with law 
enforcement in the public mind that efforts to reform police and policing 
somehow feel like they must address potential evils arising amongst their 
prosecutorial counterparts.  Moreover, any criticism of prosecutors, both 
from the legal academy and other sources, largely falls on those operating 
in the federal system; this disproportionate focus on federal criminal 
prosecution is easily explained by the greater homogeneity of the federal 
system, which renders it correspondingly more straightforward to study, 
especially with tools of data collection and analysis.86  This Article makes a 
unique contribution to prosecution-focused scholarship by departing from 
the usual federal focus and instead concentrating on the prosecutorial 
functions of those smaller jurisdictions such as counties and municipalities 
that often go neglected by scholars and the wider, popular media. 
C.  GOVERNANCE OF PROSECUTORS UNDER ABA AND NDAA 
STANDARDS AND ABA MODEL RULES 
Both the federal government and every state in the nation has the 
authority, to differing degrees, to prosecute criminal offenses generally 
committed within their borders.  Engaging in a study of criminal law on a 
state level is often challenging given the great variance in laws and policies 
between all the states.  To some degree, however, there is great unity in the 
promulgation of each state’s rules of professional conduct as applied to 
prosecutors; each state has to some extent adopted the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).87  The 
 
2016/deason-koch-gift-26april2016 (“Policy makers across the ideological spectrum are 
talking about the need for criminal justice reform . . . [f]rom the adequacy of defense 
counsel, to police uses of force, to wrongful convictions and the racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system.”). 
86  Sara Sun Beale, Prosecutorial Discretion in Three Systems: Balancing Conflicting 
Goals and Providing Mechanisms for Control, in DISCRETIONARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A 
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 27, 31 (Michele Caianiello & Jaqueline S. Hodgson eds., 2015). 
The United States is a federal system, and both the federal government and the states have the 
authority to define and punish criminal violations.  This division of responsibility permits 
significant difference between federal and state practice, and . . . between and within individual 
states.  This variability is enhanced by traditions concerning the training and selection of both 
individual prosecutors and chief prosecutors.  In general, the U.S. systems promote some form of 
democratic accountability, and the fragmentation of authority virtually guarantees that different 
offices will develop different priorities and practices. 
Id. at 31. 
87  AM. BAR ASS’N, States Making Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct Dates of Adoption, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
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bar associations of each of the states, with the exception of Wyoming, 
issued public ethics opinions in an effort to educate attorneys about the 
proper application of their respective ethical rules as well.88  The ABA has 
also promulgated its Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution 
Function (ABA Prosecution Standards) serving as a complement to the 
Model Rules and providing greater specificity than the Rules regarding 
concerns unique to prosecutors.89 The National District Attorneys 
Association (NDAA) has also circulated its own set of National Prosecution 
Standards (National Prosecution Standards).90  These National Standards 
are much more comprehensive than the Model Rules as well as the ABA 
Standards,91 likely due to the National Standards being written for 
prosecutors by prosecutors.92  Both sets of standards are similar in that they 
both encourage and urge their adoption in not just a formal, but also a 
practical sense93, and begin by grounding themselves in an exhortation to 
prosecutors to “seek justice,”94 whatever that may mean. 
Both sets of standards from the ABA and NDAA forthrightly express 
an overwhelming preference for full-time attorneys of the sort that follow 
traditional prosecutorial norms as described in Part I.B above.  The ABA 
Prosecution Standards provide that 
 
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/chrono_list_state_adopting_model_rules.
html (last visited June 12, 2016). 
88  See AM. BAR ASS’N, Links to Other Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
Pages, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/links_of_
interest.html#States (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
89  The ABA Prosecution Standards explain that: 
[T]hese Standards are intended to provide guidance for the professional conduct and 
performance of prosecutors.  They are written and intended to be entirely consistent with the 
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and are not intended to modify a prosecutor’s 
obligations under applicable rules, statutes, or the constitution.  They are aspirational or describe 
“best practices,” and are not intended to serve as the basis for the imposition of professional 
discipline, to create substantive or procedural rights for accused or convicted persons, to create a 
standard of care for civil liability, or to serve as a predicate for a motion to suppress evidence or 
dismiss a charge. 
ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 15, at Standard 3-1.1(b). 
90  Similar to the ABA Prosecution Standards, the National Standards were “intended to 
supplement rather than replace the existing rules of ethical conduct that apply in a 
jurisdiction.” NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009). 
91  Mitchell Stephens, Ignoring Justice: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Ethics of 
Charging, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 53, 56 (2008). 
92  NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 90. 
93  See Stephens, supra note 91. 
94  NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 90, at Standard 1-1.1; ABA 
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 15, at Standard 3-1.2(b). 
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(a) The prosecution function should be performed by a lawyer who is 
 (i) a public official, 
 (ii) authorized to practice law in the jurisdiction, 
  and 
 (iii) subject to rules of attorney professional conduct and discipline.95 
A brief justification for limiting the preferred organization of the 
prosecutorial function is also provided: “Prosecutors whose professional 
obligations are devoted full-time and exclusively to the prosecution 
function are preferable to part-time prosecutors who have other potentially 
conflicting professional responsibilities.”96 The National Prosecution 
Standards also encourage a full-time rather than part-time scheme in even 
stronger terms than those found in the ABA Prosecution Standards: 
The chief prosecutor in a jurisdiction should be a full-time position. A full-time 
prosecutor, whether the chief prosecutor or otherwise, should neither maintain nor 
profit from a private legal practice. A chief prosecutor may serve part-time in those 
jurisdictions that are unable or unwilling to fund a full-time prosecutor, but while 
serving as a part-time prosecutor may not engage professional conduct that is 
inconsistent with the need for prosecutorial independence.97 
Both sets of standards explicitly warn against deviating from the 
prosecutorial norm of full-time government employment and representation 
for the very salient reason of avoiding the inevitable conflicts of interest 
that will arise by both serving the government as well as serving private 
clients while focusing on perceptions of propriety, several of which are 
discussed in this Article, below. The NDAA Standards hint at potential 
issues of public accountability and transparency, divided loyalties, and 
other potential conflicts of interest, with the Commentary to the NDAA 
standards explicitly stating that: 
[T]here are many part-time prosecutors in the United States. This situation is 
generally created by the societal preference for local accountability and control in 
locations where the sparse population, geographic size of the jurisdiction, budget and 
caseload do not warrant that the position be approached as a full-time one. The 
position of this standard is that the office be approached on a full-time basis insofar as 
that is possible in any jurisdiction.98 
Both sets of standards also, however, envision circumstances under which 
hiring by jurisdictions of part-time prosecutors is, unfortunately, an 
 
95  ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 15, at Standard 3-2.1(a). 
96  Id. 
97  NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 90, at Standard 1-1.3. 
98  Id. at Standard 1-1.6 cmt. 
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inevitability.99 
II.  OUTSOURCING OF PROSECUTORIAL SERVICES 
Part II introduces readers to the challenges faced by smaller 
jurisdictions that render them unable to either hire a full-time city or county 
prosecutor, or have elections to fill such a position, leading them to depend 
upon prosecutors hired on a part-time, contractual basis.  This section then 
goes on to give an operational definition of “outsourcing” for purposes of 
this Article and to describe the RFP competitive bidding process more fully.  
Subsequently, this Part describes and analyzes prosecutorial RFPs issued 
from ten different local governments throughout the United States, with 
particular focus on language that would drive prosecution to become more 
profit-motivated, as well as other relevant factors such as clauses regulating 
future removal of the aspiring part-time prosecutor/RFP applicant. 
The vast majority of scholarship exploring criminal law does so at a 
federal or state level; small local governments such as cities, towns, or 
counties in which municipal or justice courts, as well as their city 
attorneys/prosecutors, mostly handle misdemeanors100 and are rarely 
examined by the media, let alone by legal scholars.  Such a paucity in 
scholarship presents a significant gap; if local governments are placed in 
positions in which they must choose a method by which to hire a 
prosecutor, they should be aware of the risks that come with privatizing the 
function through the RFP process. David Carroll, executive director of the 
Sixth Amendment Center in Boston, spoke to the importance of this 
neglect, noting that “[m]isdemeanors matter.  For most people, our nation’s 
misdemeanor courts are the place of initial contact with the criminal justice 
systems.  Much of a citizenry’s confidence in the courts as a whole – their 
faith in the state’s ability to dispense justice fairly and effectively – is 
framed through these initial encounters.”101 
The most recent (and possibly only widely available) national survey 
of prosecutors in smaller jurisdictions was undertaken by the Department of 
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), which released its findings on 
 
99  Id.; see also ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 15, at Standard 3-2.1(a). 
100  Deviating from this trend and demonstrating the difficulty of being able to describe 
local criminal justice systems by way of generalization, prosecutors who are hired to 
represent counties, for example, may have the ability and need to prosecute more serious 
felony offenses. 
101  Sixth Amendment Center, The Right to Counsel in Utah: An Assessment of Trial-
Level Indigent Defense Services, X (2015), http://sixthamendment.org/6ac/6AC_utahreport. 
pdf. 
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state and local prosecutors’ offices in January 2003.102  While most popular 
media such as television or movies depict prosecutors in large and gritty 
cities, about 23% of the nation’s prosecutors’ offices have a chief 
prosecutor who was hired on a part-time basis, running counter to the usual 
public perception of the job.103  The median budget for offices with part-
time prosecutors was only $95,000.104  Nearly 9 in 10 of the nation’s 
prosecutors practice in an office servicing populations of less than 250,000: 
This figure represents almost 40% of the nation’s population.105 The 
prosecutors’ offices in these smaller districts overwhelmingly have had 
difficulties hiring new attorneys given their scant budgets and inability to 
offer competitive salaries to new attorneys.106  Although this data is 
interesting and hints at the challenges posed to prosecutors in small 
districts, including those where a city, county, or other governmental 
subdivision is unable or unwilling to find a full-time prosecutor, the BJS 
survey unfortunately only covered, “all chief prosecutors that tried felony 
cases in State courts of general jurisdiction.”107 
Data regarding the operation of criminal justice systems on a more 
localized level, including cities, towns, and counties, is desperately needed.  
Although the BJS survey was certainly extensive, receiving responses from 
most of the 2,341 prosecutors’ offices that handled felonies, it is no wonder 
that a widespread survey of prosecutors in myriad cities, counties, towns, 
and other districts that have their own prosecutors has not yet been 
accomplished.108 
A.  SPATIAL INEQUALITY, DWINDLING TAX BASES, AND DEVOLUTION 
Additional challenges face small, rural jurisdictions that might be 
inclined to hire a full-time prosecutor but for their isolation109 and poor tax 
 
102  CAROL J. DEFRANCES, STATE COURT PROSECUTORS IN SMALL DISTRICTS, 2001, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 2 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/scpsd01.pdf. (“Even though they constitute the majority of the prosecutors’ offices 
nationwide, little information has been reported about prosecutors’ offices serving smaller 
districts with a population under 250,000.  The 2001 [National Survey of Prosecutors] 
provides the first opportunity to comprehensively examine these offices.”) 
103  Id. at 9. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. at 1. 
106  Id. at 3–4. 
107  Id. at 1. 
108  See id. at 10. 
109  “Rural places are often defined by their ‘relatively sparse populations and relative 
isolation from urban areas,’ sometimes referred to as the ‘ecological component’ of rurality.” 
Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access to Justice in Rural 
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bases.110 There has recently been desperately needed focus on access to 
justice in rural and smaller communities in legal scholarship.111  Much of 
this scholarship has understandably focused on issues such as access to 
attorneys and access to justice generally for people living in smaller 
jurisdictions, as well as examining access to other constitutionally protected 
services, such as abortion.112  In the context of criminal justice, this focus 
turns to public defense funding and availability, given that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is arguably the most important of rights 
afforded to a criminal defendant as it would be an especial challenge to 
assert any other rights without an attorney’s assistance.113 
Greater scrutiny, however, should fall upon the prosecutorial systems 
of local governments, particularly smaller counties, cities, and towns.  In a 
recent survey conducted in 2007, “eighty-seven percent of local government 
respondents stated that their primary reason for choosing privatization” of a 
variety of services was “an attempt[] to decrease cost.”114  Many of the 
same factors germane in examining access to justice or public defense in 
such jurisdictions are also important when considering the prosecutorial 
side of criminal adjudication.  These include lack of personal wealth due to 
a paucity of development and other economic opportunities, thereby 
limiting potential tax revenues, especially when “many states underfund 
municipal and county governments.”115 
 
America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 466, 485 (2014) (quoting Frank L. Farmer, The Definition of 
“Rural” in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RURAL AMERICA: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 833 (Gary A. 
Goreham ed., 2d ed. 2008)). 
110  “[N]onmetropolitan county governments and small municipalities generally struggle 
to provide all sorts of services and functions because of the inability to achieve economies of 
scale, and because they typically depend on local sales or property taxes, which are less 
robust than in urban locales.”  Id. at 501 (citing Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice 
Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 
242–46 (2010). 
111  See, e.g., Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 110; Pruitt & Showman, supra note 109; Lisa 
R. Pruitt, J. Cliff McKinney, II, & Bart Calhoun, Justice in the Hinterlands: Arkansas as a 
Case Study of the Rural Lawyer Shortage and Evidence-Based Solutions to Alleviate It, 37 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 573, 573–74 (2015); Hillary A. Wandler, Spreading Justice to 
Rural Montana: Rurality’s Impacts on Supply and Demand for Legal Services in Montana, 
76 MONT. L. REV. 225, 229 (2015). 
112  See, e.g., Pruitt & Showman, supra note 109, at 467; Robin Runge & Christyne J. 
Vachon, Planting the Seeds and Getting into the Field: The Role of Law Schools in Ensuring 
Access to Justice in Rural Communities, 59 S.D. L. REV. 616, 617–22 (2014). 
113  See, e.g., Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 110, at 219. 
114  Epstein, supra note 21, at 2236 (quoting Sam Dolnick, At Penal Unit, A Volatile Mix 
Fuels a Murder, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2012, at A1). 
115  Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 110, at 228–29 (arguing that nonmetropolitan local 
governments often have smaller budgets with which to serve needier populations). 
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An additional challenge facing local governments and prompting 
greater outsourcing of their services116 generally is the trend toward 
devolution of government obligations and responsibilities.117  Devolution of 
responsibilities from state to local government has, especially in recent 
decades, been championed as a prospective measure to increase efficiency 
and allow for public policy decisions more customizable to such local 
governments and the populaces that they serve in a variety of industries and 
contexts.118  Devolution, however, has not always been the panacea that it 
 
Nonmetropolitan (nonmetro) communities have also generally suffered from higher rates of 
poverty than metropolitan (metro) communities.  The federal Office of Management and 
Budget has defined metropolitan communities as: 
broad labor-market areas that include: 1. Central counties with one or more urbanized areas; 
urbanized areas are densely-settled urban entities with 50,000 or more people. 2. Outlying 
counties that are economically tied to the core counties as measured by labor-force community. 
Outlying counties are included if 25 percent of workers living in the county commute to the 
central counties, or if 25 percent of the employment in the county consists of workers coming out 
of the central counties – the so-called “reverse” commuting pattern. 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Rural Classifications: What is Rural?, USDA, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/rural-classifications/what-is-
rural.aspx (last visited July 14, 2016). 
 There has been a higher incidence of nonmetro poverty versus metro poverty since 
official poverty rates were recorded in the 1960s.  In nonmetro communities compared to 
metro areas, this rate was 4.5% higher in the 1980s, 2.6% higher in the 1990s, and 2.7% 
higher from 2000 to 2009. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Rural Poverty and 
Well-Being: Poverty Overview, USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-
population/rural-poverty-well-being/poverty-overview.aspx (last visited July 14, 2016).  In 
2010, this gap reached its second narrowest since such data was recorded—a 1.6% 
difference, with the uneven recovery following the recession of 2007–2009 accepted as the 
cause of this narrowing. Id. For purposes of producing subnational and subpopulation 
poverty estimates, use of the American Community Survey, with its dramatically larger 
sample size than required by the Current Population Survey (CPS), is encouraged by the 
Census Bureau.  Poverty rates for the most recently available year (2014) were 18.1% 
nonmetro and 15.1% metro, perhaps reflecting the same sort of trends that were observed 
before the Great Recession. Id. 
116  Epstein, supra note 21, at 2213. 
117  Patricia M. Wald, Looking Forward to the Next Millennium: Social Preview to Legal 
Change, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1085, 1098 (1997). 
118  See Richard P. Nathan & Thomas L. Gais, Is Devolution Working? Federal and State 
Roles in Welfare, BROOKINGS INST. (June 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-
devolution-working-federal-and-state-roles-in-welfare/ (“[S]ome states have devolved 
considerable control and responsibility for developing programs down to localities”). These 
issues are wide ranging, from greater local control of transportation, school choice, and, 
especially in the western United States, greater control of lands that are currently federally 
controlled. See also Robert Tannenwald, The Devolution: The New Federalism—An 
Overview, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., at 2 (May/June 1998); Martin Wachs, Local Option 
Transportation Taxes: Devolution as Revolution, ACCESS (Spring 2003), at 9; Note, 
Education Policy Litigation as Devolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 929, 930 (2015); Devolution: 
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has been made out to be.  Foisting responsibilities upon local governments 
has raised concerns that not only would a lack of funds present challenges, 
but that the “technical, and civic capacity of many communities can pose a 
serious problem for meeting local needs,” including the need for 
prosecutors who seek justice.119 
B.  DEFINING “OUTSOURCING” AND “PRIVATIZATION” 
There are, of course different manners in which local governments and 
small political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, and towns, may 
provide essential services to their citizens and residents. These would 
include any number of governmental functions, such as utility services, 
park maintenance, and waste management. As discussed above in Part I.B, 
many smaller jurisdictions, for reasons that will be discussed below, prefer 
to privatize, to some extent, their prosecution functions.120 Such 
arrangements may take myriad forms, but can be roughly categorized as 
consisting of 1) contracting out for prosecution services, 2) hiring on part-
time prosecutors, or 3) utilizing private prosecutors who are funded 
exclusively by victims.121  This Article focuses exclusively on those cities, 
counties, and other political governmental subdivisions below the state 
level that rely on “contracting out” prosecutorial services by way of a 
competitive bidding process. 
 
A Canadian Solution to Excessive Federal Ownership of Public Lands, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. 
COUNCIL (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.alec.org/article/devolution-a-canadian-solution-to-
excessive-federal-ownership-of-public-lands/. 
 Greater federal control over functions such as social welfare was asserted with the Great 
Depression and advanced throughout the 1960s. See Jeffrey S. Sharp & Domenico M. Parisi, 
Devolution: Who is Responsible for Rural America?, in CHALLENGES FOR RURAL AMERICA 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 353, 354–56 (David L. Brown & Louis E. Swanson eds., 
2003). A greater move toward devolution and local control, however, began under the Nixon 
administration, partly in response to growing concern over a large, centralized federal 
government, a cultural preference for greater local control, and increased difficulties local, 
state, and national governments experienced while trying to cooperate together to tackle the 
issues of the day.  See id. 
119  Id. at 353. 
120  Fairfax, supra note 22, at 267 (“Government engages in a substantial amount of 
privatization.  Privatization is a word with many different meanings, but it typically is used 
to characterize the phenomenon in which government delegates to the private sector 
functions formerly performed by the state and deemed to be public.”). 
121  This Article does not venture to examine closely victim-funded prosecution given its 
relative rarity.  While more common in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
proliferation of “public order” types of crimes in the nineteenth century led to decreased 
numbers of victim-funded prosecutors and to the growth of more professionalized 
prosecution services hired by governments. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16 (2012). 
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This specific form of outsourcing, however, does not consist of 
“complete privatization”122 so much as “partial privatization,” under which 
the government retains the responsibility to prosecute crime but “contracts 
with a private actor to perform it.”123  Although maintaining an increased 
level of (hyper) local control could make utilizing a contracting-out model 
more appealing to certain communities—rather than relying on a 
corresponding state agency for the vast majority of jurisdictions contracting 
out—the major concerns are budgetary.  As explained by Professor Fairfax: 
Jurisdictions with relatively small populations may not have the tax base to support a 
public prosecutor. In addition, the crime rate in a sparsely populated community may 
not justify the expenditure for a traditional full-time public prosecutor.  Furthermore, 
privatizing criminal prosecution in these jurisdictions can increase criminal 
prosecution capacity, which, in turn, might enhance efficiency, public safety, and 
fairness by speeding criminal case processing, reducing crime, saving court 
administration costs, and diminishing the human and financial costs of pretrial 
detention.124 
Jurisdictions using a contracting out model are usually limited in their 
options, as noted by Professor Fairfax.125  The extreme budgetary limits and 
shortfalls seen in smaller and/or rural jurisdictions, however, have also 
begun to manifest themselves in larger jurisdictions, as well.  To effectively 
manage the great demands placed upon them through increased devolution 
of responsibilities, local governments require sufficient funding and 
administrative capacities. It should not be surprising that in a country and 
culture in which free markets are prized that “private providers are assumed 
to be more efficient and innovative than government because they operate 
in competitive markets.”126  Such privatization, however, can lead to greater 
disparities between wealthier local governments versus economically 
depressed ones, and smaller local governments versus larger ones; 
approaching privatization on unequal footing will often lead to unequal 
results: “Local governments that lack the fiscal capacity to respond to 
development challenges will be caught in a vicious circle. Poor economic 
development leads to limited government revenues, which in turn limit 
 
122  BRUCE L. BENSON, TO SERVE AND PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15 (1998) (explaining that “complete privatization” would consist of 
exclusive private sector control over resource allocation). 
123  Fairfax, supra note 22, at 268. 
124  Id. at 282. 
125  Fairfax, supra note 12, 416–17. 
126  Mildred E. Warner, Competition, Cooperation, and Local Governance, in 
CHALLENGES FOR RURAL AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 252, 253 (David L. 
Brown & Louis E. Swanson, eds. 2003) (citing Emanuel S. Savas, PRIVATIZATION AND 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2000)). 
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government investment, in turn reducing future economic development.”127  
Although there has, justifiably, been much scholarship and media coverage 
focusing on public defense budgets and funding, prosecutors’ offices have 
likewise had to find ways to cut costs and manage in a more restrictive 
financial landscape.128  With the challenge of poor economic conditions for 
local governments potentially spreading to larger cities as discussed in Part 
II.A above,129 the outsourcing of the criminal prosecution function may, 
unfortunately, continue to spread in a deleterious way and be employed in 
shortsighted attempts to boost economic efficiencies while ignoring the 
long-term risks and damage. 
C.  THE COMPETITIVE BIDDING/RFP PROCESS 
Although it is next to impossible to discuss the procurement process 
for every local government throughout the United States within the expanse 
of one article,130 there are steps and requirements that, generally, every 
jurisdiction strongly encourages, if not mandates, when hiring for services.  
One of these usual requirements, competitive bidding, is intended to make 
hiring processes transparent and fair for applicants and to keep costs to local 
government low while still attracting the most qualified candidates.  
However, both state and local governments will “often require proof of cost 
savings prior to permitting” services or goods to be procured through the 
RFP/bidding process, as well as through other privatization methods.131  
Local governments commonly enjoy much discretion and flexibility in 
determining their own procurement processes132; such processes are usually 
 
127  Id. at 252, 255. 
128  See, e.g., Madelyn Beck, Ketchikan DA’s Office Feeling Budget Cuts, KRBD FM 
(Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.krbd.org/2015/08/25/ketchikan-das-office-feeling-budget-cuts/; 
Kimberly Jackson, State Budget Cuts Impact Public Safety, KTUL.COM (Jan. 20, 2016), 
http://ktul.com/news/local/state-budget-cuts-impact-public-safety; Greg Land, Fulton County 
District Attorney and Public Defender Say Budget Cuts Force Furloughs, DAILY REPT. (Mar. 
16, 2016), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202752402986/Fulton-County-District-Att
orney-and-Public-Defender-Say-Budget-Cuts-Force-Furloughs; Lawrence Specker, Mobile 
County DA Cuts Staff, Blames Funding Crunch, AL.COM (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.al.
com/news/mobile/index.ssf/2016/04/mobile_county_da_cuts_staff_bl.html. 
129  Governing the States and Localities, Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map, 
(2015), http://www.governing.com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-def
aults.html. 
130  This task would require a great deal of data collection and synthesis, as well as the 
publication of that data into what would likely be a rather unwieldy tome. 
131  Applicants may even be required to demonstrate that they can provide the goods or 
service more cheaply than the local government itself could. Epstein, supra note 21, at 2237. 
132  There are occasions, however, in which a specific project or position is underwritten 
partly or wholly by separate grant funding.  Oftentimes such grants may require their own 
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more onerous for more important positions that need filling or tasks that 
need to be accomplished.133  The formality of the procurement process 
employed may also depend on the approximated value of the contract, with 
the most rigorous process being competitive bidding.134 
To initiate the competitive bidding process a local government will 
draft a document known widely as a request for proposal.135  Commonly, 
public notice statutes require the publication of a legal notice, usually in a 
major (for the respective jurisdiction and readership) daily newspaper 
announcing the solicitation of RFPs.136 The RFP is much more than the 
usual job vacancy announcement or help wanted sign; it usually consists of 
a public invitation to submit a proposal to provide a service that an agency 
has identified is needed.137  The issuer of the RFP is, theoretically, then able 
to best judge each proponent’s experience, qualifications, and approach in 
evaluating who would best be best equipped to provide the needed service 
with the greatest value.138  RFPs will often include or ask for the following: 
1) a statement of what services are needed, 2) a schedule for the project or 
the term of years for which the service is being solicited, 3) qualifications 
needed and evaluation criteria, and 4) a request for a budget, including 
salary, supplies, assistants, and any other costs that may be envisioned 
while serving as prosecutor.139  Although this often-convoluted process is 
meant to allow local governments to best determine each applicant’s 
experience, qualifications, and other merits, contracts are generally awarded 
to the lowest bidder, with other factors often playing at best, a secondary 
role in the decision.140 
 
prescribed procurement requirements that will necessarily limit how a local government 
makes its decision.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN GRANT 
PROGRAMS, at https://www.justice.gov/ovw/grantees#s1 (last visited May 1, 2016). 
133  JON M. WALTON ET AL., BEST VALUE IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CONCEPTS AND 
PRACTICES 3–5 (2013), http://www.nigp.org/docs/default-source/New-Site/position-papers/
150105_best-value_position-paper-complete_updated.pdf?sfvrsn=4 (discussing Best Value 
Policies). 
134  Contracting and Competitive Bidding, MUN. RES. & SERVS. CTR., http://mrsc.org/
getdoc/99fac994-e481-44dd-8639-c557b887893c/Contracting-and-Competitive-Bidding.
aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) (“The most rigorous and time-intensive competitive processes 
are known as formal competitive bidding.”). 
135  Request for Proposal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
136  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-2806 (2005). 
137  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30B, § 6 (2016). 
138  See generally WALTON, supra note 133, at 4. 
139  See generally A Guide to Writing a Request for Proposal, WAREHOUSING EDUC. & 
RES. COUNCIL, http://www.werc.org/assets/1/assetmanager/rfpwritingguide.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2016). 
140  See Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) Selection Process vs. Best Value 
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D.  SAMPLES OF PROSECUTORIAL OUTSOURCING RFPS THROUGHOUT 
THE UNITED STATES 
One needs to be familiar with examples of RFP language to understand 
the conflicts such solicitations by local governments pose, along with the 
often perverse economic incentives to depart from the prosecutorial norm of 
“doing justice.” Although these cities and their RFPs have been included as 
examples that could give rise to the perverse economic incentives that this 
Article examines, their inclusion certainly is not meant to imply that there 
has been any malfeasance—past or present—committed by the employees 
of any of these localities. 
1.  Green River, Wyoming 
The City of Green River recently released an RFP for a city 
prosecutor.141 Proposals were due on February 16, 2015 for a term to run 
through January 31, 2019, subject to early termination if needed.142  The 
duties assigned to the city prosecutor consisted, in broad terms, of enforcing 
city ordinances in the Green River Municipal Court.143  The qualifications 
sought were exceptionally minimal, consisting of 1) a Juris Doctor, 2) 
membership in the Wyoming State Bar, and 3) a license to practice in state 
and federal court; the third factor effectively duplicated the second.144  
Applicants were required to “detail the compensation requested to perform” 
the duties described, with potential compensation packages to be arranged 
in one of three ways: 1) a monthly retainer as well as an hourly rate for 
services that went beyond the usual monthly scope, 2) an annual salary 
including city health insurance, and 3) an annual salary excluding health 
benefits.145  The city explained that review “of all proposals will include, 
but is not limited to, overall cost to the City . . . .”146  Although language 
regarding the importance of overall cost certainly encourages attorneys to 
underbid each other as much as possible, it also impliedly encourages a 
profit-driven approach: an applicant may be successful in having their 
contracts continuously renewed if they generate enough in the way of fines 
 
Evaluation Bid Protest, WATSON & ASSOC., http://blog.theodorewatson.com/lowest-price-
technically-acceptable-versus-best-value-bid-protest/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) (“The LPTA 
evaluation approach is more popular nowadays.”). 
141  CITY OF GREEN RIVER, WYO., CITY PROSECUTOR REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL 1 (2015) 
(on file with author). 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. at 2. 
145  Id. at 3. 
146  Id. 
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and fees to counteract the cost of their contract. 
2.  Lakeville, Minnesota 
Lakeville released an RFP seeking to fill two vacancies—one for a city 
attorney and another for a prosecutor.147  The RFP submittal deadline was 
April 8, 2016, with final approval to have taken place on June 6, 2016.148  
The city prosecutor’s duties consist, mainly, of prosecuting misdemeanors 
in Lakeville’s municipal court.149  In addition to describing prior experience 
and explaining how the applicant planned to make themselves “readily 
accessible to City personnel, especially police officers,” applicants were 
required to provide “a detailed description and explanation of all fees and/or 
charges that may arise for provided prosecution and related legal 
services.”150  This explanation was not to be limited only to the attorney’s 
services, but for proposed staff, as well.151  When evaluating proposals the 
city made it clear that it intended to “award a contract to the proposer(s) 
evaluated to be best qualified to perform the work for the City, cost and 
other factors considered.”152  Although the city anticipated hiring a 
prosecutor for a minimum of three years, a new contract was required each 
year with expected annual renewals and either party could terminate the 
relationship with 90 days’ notice.153  The constant threat of removal outlines 
in the RFP places a great deal of pressure on any applicants to do exactly 
what the city would want. 
3.  River Falls, Wisconsin 
River Falls released its RFP for a municipal prosecutor on March 6, 
2015.154  The duties of the municipal prosecutor were limited to prosecuting 
city-issued citations in the River Falls municipal court.155  The municipal 
prosecutor was also responsible for handling appeals from the municipal to 
 
147  CITY OF LAKEVILLE, MINN., LEGAL SERVICES REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS 2 (2016) (on 
file with author). 
148  Id. at 1. 
149  Id. at 6. 
150  Id. at 7. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  CITY OF LAKEVILLE, MINN., LEGAL SERVICES REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS 8 (2016) (on 
file with author). 
154  CITY OF RIVER FALLS, WIS., REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, MUNICIPAL PROSECUTOR 5 
(2015) (on file with author). 
155  Id. at 1. 
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county level circuit court.156  Although the required personal qualifications 
of applicants were relatively minimal (i.e., references, descriptions of 
training, and experience), the RFP requested a “methodology for how the 
individual or firm will bill the City for its services,” with the city 
entertaining only “hourly or flat fee approach[es].”157  Applicants were to 
include the costs of all support staff and other overhead expenses.158  Oddly 
enough, proposals were to first be evaluated by the municipal judge in 
whose court the new prosecutor would appear, as well as city staff.159  The 
judge’s recommendation was to then be forwarded to the city council.160  It 
was the city’s priority to select the attorney or law firm that would provide 
“the best value,” specifically considering physical availability, prior 
experience, and “the proposed price.”161  The city wished to enter into a 
two-year contract, with either party able to cancel with 90 days’ notice.162  
Once again, a successful applicant would be placed in a precarious situation 
with the city, with removal from the position by way of cancellation of the 
contract relatively easy. 
4.  Ephraim City, Utah 
Ephraim City recently solicited proposals by way of RFP; proposals 
were due on February 27, 2015 with the position to start on July 1, 2015.163  
Ephraim is an especially small city with a population of 6,431 and, as such, 
has combined the duties of civil city attorney with city prosecutor into one 
position.164  The proposed contract was specified to run for two years, with 
the potential to extend at its conclusion for an additional two years.165  
Along with providing city attorney services,166 the applicant hired would be 
tasked with prosecuting misdemeanors arising in Ephraim.167  Although 
 
156  Id. 
157  Id. at 6. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. at 9. 
160  CITY OF RIVER FALLS, WIS., REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, MUNICIPAL PROSECUTOR 9 
(2015) (on file with author). 
161  Id. at 9–10. 
162  Id. at 3. 
163  EPHRAIM CITY, UTAH, REQUESTS FOR PROPOSALS FOR LEGAL SERVICES–CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL 1 (2015) (on file with author). 
164  Id. at 3. 
165  Id. at 4. 
166  These include tasks such as attending city council meetings, drafting ordinances, and 
reviewing all contracts entered into by the city (including, presumably, those for outsourced 
public defense work). 
167
 EPHRAIM CITY, UTAH, supra note 163. 
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more rigorous screening is prescribed by this RFP, including a minimum 
requirement of five years of legal experience and knowledge and experience 
in municipal law,168 this RFP also requires the most detailed fee proposal of 
all the RFPs examined in this piece thus far.  Applicants were required to 
provide an hourly or monthly retainer rate (unsurprisingly Ephraim City 
preferred a retainer rate “in an effort to manage costs effectively”), as well 
as account for all extra potential costs, including providing estimates for 
“minimum increments of time billed for each service including phone calls, 
correspondence and personal conferences” as well as reimbursable expenses 
“including travel (per mile), telephone, printing, photocopying, etc.,”169 
providing a chilling effect for those who might have asked for greater 
resources when the need arose to do prosecutorial job well. Perhaps the 
most troubling aspect of this RFP are its provisions for removal: any 
contract a successful applicant and the city would agree upon was required 
to specify that the attorney serves as “an independent contractor serving at 
the will of the City Council,” and that it was the city’s “right to terminate 
the agreement, at its sole discretion, upon the provision of notice.”170  An 
attorney could be, practically speaking, fired at any time, for any reason, 
with no such reciprocal right offered to cancel the contract. 
5.  Kyle, Texas 
The city of Kyle is located in Hays County and is only twenty miles 
south of Austin and fifty miles northeast of San Antonio.171  Located on the 
35 Freeway, Kyle cannot be characterized in any respect as being 
geographically isolated or rural so much as a suburb of Austin.  Kyle, 
however, is presented here as an example of the RFP process for choosing a 
criminal prosecutor spreading outside of the rural localities in which the 
practice is usually found. 
Kyle was founded in 1881 at its respective site along the International-
Great Northern Railroad line.172  Since 2000, Kyle’s population has grown 
dramatically, from 5,314 in 2000 to 28,016 in 2010 and an estimated 35,733 
in 2015, reflecting the rapid growth happening throughout many Texas 
cities.173  Such massive growth in formerly small, rural towns and cities 
 
168  Id. 
169  Id. at 6. 
170  Id. at 7. 
171  Kyle, Texas, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/Kyle-Texas.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
172  City of Kyle, Texas, History of Kyle, http://www.cityofkyle.com/community/history-
kyle (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
173  U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder, Kyle City, Texas, Annual Estimates of 
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often left such local governments in difficult positions in which they would 
not possess the authority to enact policy to handle such changes.174 
Kyle recently issued an RFP seeking proposals by May 23, 2016 for a 
prosecutor in its municipal court, with a contract start date of July 1, 
2016.175  Kyle’s municipal court handled “approximately 6,000 cases 
annually,” consisting mainly of “moving violations and a small number of 
cases pertaining to code and juvenile violations.”176  The qualifications for 
such a prosecutor as listed in the FRP were perfunctory, stating that a 
candidate should be “qualified and capable” and, oddly, should never have 
filed for nor have been adjudged bankrupt.177  According to the RFP, the 
evaluating factors in screening through proposals was “1) Completeness of 
the proposal submitted, 2) Understanding of the scope of work and services 
provided, 3) Individual attorney’s or law firm’s experience and of its 
assigned personnel, 4) Availability and accessibility, 5) Compensation.”178 
Although experience may seem like a significant factor to consider, 
especially compared with some of the RFPs discussed above, in a 
geographic setting with proximity to Austin and El Paso, finding attorneys 
with five or more years of experience would likely not narrow the field 
prohibitively as doing so in an area with only two or three active attorneys. 
Apart from the experience and compensation factors, completeness of a 
proposal, understanding of the nature of the job itself, and being physically 
present for the job are not particularly demanding factors for any attorney 
proponents for the City using the factors.  The terms regarding cancellation 
of the contract, however, are more illuminating: 
The City reserves the right to terminate the contract if the successful Offeror does not 
perform to the City’s satisfaction. 
The City of Kyle is a home-rule municipal corporation operated and funded on an 
October 1 to September 30 basis; accordingly, the City reserves the right to terminate, 
without liability to the City, any contract (or renewal option) for which funding is not 
available.179 
The focus of cancellation of a contract under the RFP rests on the 
satisfaction of the town council, rather than voters; termination should also 
 
the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2015, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/
table/1.0/en/PEP/2015/PEPANNRES/1620000US4839952 (last visited July 15, 2016). 
174  See Sharp & Parisi, supra note 118, at 255. 
175  CITY OF KYLE, TEX., REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS, RFP NO. 2016-03-PM, PROSECUTION 
SERVICES FOR MUNICIPAL COURT 2 (2016) (on file with author). 
176  Id. at 5–6. 
177  Id. at 8. 
178  Id. at 10. 
179  Id. at 7. 
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be expected by a prosecutor hired by RFP if they are not able to bring in the 
funding necessary to keep their jobs, along with keeping the city council 
satisfied. 
6.  Hortonville, Wisconsin 
The village of Hortonville is located on the shores of Black Otter Lake 
in Outagamie County, Wisconsin.  Hortonville’s population estimate for 
2015 was 2,712.180  The submitted due date for any proposals was due on 
September 30, 2014.181  The winner of the bid was expected to “represent 
the Village in prosecuting violations of state law” and the applicable 
municipal code.182  The village was seeking to contract with a law firm or 
attorney for two years; no provisions for removal were provided.183  
Hortonville’s police department issued, on average, 70 to 75 citations a 
month.184 
Hortonville’s RFP is an aberration amongst the RFPs examined in this 
Article.  An entire section of the RFP was dedicated to a section entitled 
“Prosecution Philosophy,” which expounded upon the duties of the 
successful candidate: “The Prosecutor’s decisions and dispositions of cases 
need to be consistent with community concerns about maintaining and 
improving a positive image of the Village, in addition to promoting peace 
and order.”185  At no point, however, is serving the interests of justice in any 
of its incarnations mentioned—the exclusive focus of the “philosophy” 
outlined in the RFP is a strong, nearly singular emphasis on being 
cooperative with the police, even to the point of being required to be 
available on all nights and weekends to them.186 
Hortonville’s RFP was also unusual in that it required all submitted 
 
180  U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder, Hortonville Village, Wisconsin, Annual 
Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2015 https://factfinder.census.
gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/PEP/2015/PEPANNRES/1620000US5535850 (last visited July 14, 
2016). 
181  VILLAGE OF HORTONVILLE, WIS., REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, MUNICIPAL COURT 
PROSECUTOR SERVICES 1 (2014 on file with author). 
182  Id. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. at 2–3. 
186  “The Prosecutor should have regular and ongoing contact with police officers to 
communicate charging and filing standards and update officers of the most recent case law 
and important changes in law.  The Prosecutor must be reasonably available for night and 
weekend (24/7) contact by Hortonville Police Department personnel.”  Id. at 3.  The irony 
seems lost on the drafter of the RFP that many, if not most, attorneys would consider being 
available “24/7” including weekends for a part-time job an unreasonable request per se. 
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bids to propose an hourly rate by which the prosecutor would be 
compensated.187  There were also other requirements for the proposal that 
were not evident in the other prosecutorial RFPs covered in this paper such 
as providing an explanation of service delivery and philosophical approach 
to prosecution, as well as a list of references.188  Also odd was the 
narrowing of candidates through a screening by not only the current village 
attorney, but also the village administrator, village judge, and village chief 
of police.189  Nothing in the RFP discusses the possibility of removal prior 
to the expiration of the proposed two-year contract.190 
Hortonville’s RFP is troubling, even though it may seem more 
comprehensive in its requirements than any of the RFPs reviewed in this 
Article.  The strong emphasis on communication and collaboration with the 
police and the narrowing of proposals by the chief of police as well as the 
municipal judge presents a host of problems, including a lack of autonomy 
from the police department rather than any focus upon doing justice, as well 
as a collapse in the separation of powers by having the municipal judge 
before whom the new prosecutor would appear participating in any aspect 
of the hiring decision making. 
III.  PROSECUTORIAL BIDDING AND OUTSOURCING IS DISTINCTLY 
PROBLEMATIC 
Thus far this Article has explored, to varying levels of depth, the 
incentives (and disincentives) at play when outsourced prosecutors have 
been hired through a competitive bidding process.  Is there, however, a real, 
substantive difference between a prosecutor hired through an RFP and 
contracting-out basis versus a traditional election for the position of head 
prosecutor, or appointment of that same position?  How is hiring a 
prosecutor through a competitive bidding process any more problematic 
than employing a similar mode for procurement of any other service? 
One may argue that a mayor or local government council who is 
elected is just as publicly accountable as would be an elected prosecutor, 
and that mayors and local government councils appoint individuals to 
myriad positions every day.  Certainly some questions may arise as to how 
putting prosecutors’ jobs out to bid is any different than other sorts of 
governmental procurement at all.  The closest analog to the poor incentives 
created by putting prosecutorial positions up for public bid may be found in 
 
187  Id. at 3. 
188  Id. at 4. 
189  Id. at 5. 
190  Id. 
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the controversial practice of asset forfeiture by police in which law 
enforcement seize property suspected to be connected to illegal activity; 
“[l]ucrative forfeiture opportunities can also warp law enforcement 
priorities.”191 Revenue-generated opportunities may also warp prosecutorial 
priorities, especially when pressured to operate in a profit-driven manner by 
mayors or local government councils rather than a mandate expressed 
through popular election. In particular, this section argues that prosecutors 
hired through a competitive bidding process face increased pressures that 
could lead to greater risks of 1) self-dealing, 2) facing ethical dilemmas 
when having to divide their loyalties amongst multiple principals, and 3) 
unaccountability. There has been some substantial examination of public-
private contracting in recent decades.192 Illuminating distinctions can be 
made when comparing prosecution function bidding to bidding that occurs 
in other industries which helps to illustrate why hiring prosecutors through 
a competitive bidding process leads to unacceptably profit-driven 
prosecution.193 
Even the small samples of language from RFPs discussed in Part II.D 
above should raise red flags; they illustrate the arrangement of a local 
government contracting out for prosecution services matters implicating 
dilemmas and creating opportunities for perverse economic incentives.  
This Section argues, however, that some of those quandaries have been 
overstated, such as the fear of loyalty to former clients, while others that 
have been ignored are more deserving of our attention.  Concerns that have 
been overlooked include placing prosecutors in positions in which they 
have duties to two principals, including the government, causing them to 
lack the incentives to guarantee they do their jobs well,194 prosecutorial self-
dealing, and local governments shirking their responsibilities of providing 
quality public services.195 
Privatization of public services is a risky business, but the reasons for 
 
191  David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal 
Court, 13 NEV. L. J. 1, 31 (2012). 
192  Epstein, supra note 21, at 2215. “The prevailing sentiment in the academic literature 
is that private, profit-maximizing firms should not be entrusted with providing government 
services absent safeguards because profit-maximizing goals conflict with public service 
values.” Id. 
193  Much of what makes competitive bidding for prosecution services problematic 
versus competitive bidding for other services is prosecutions function as a “soft” government 
service.  Such soft services “tend to be more difficult to definite and measure and involve 
discretion.”  “Hard” services, on the other hand, “are easy to specify [and] involve little 
discretion.”  Id. at 2219. 
194  Id. at 2216. 
195  Id. 
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concern are particularly daunting when examining the contracting out of 
prosecutorial services to the “lowest” bidders, even when compared to other 
services that might seem to implicate similar problems such as competitive 
bidding for private prison construction and operation, as well as bidding for 
public defense contracts. 
The privatization of public services, generally, can be problematic: 
“The goal of private enterprise—to make a profit—is antithetical to the 
fundamental goals of public programs—to deliver services equitably, 
honestly, and cost efficiently,”196 particularly when paired with the 
prosecutor’s usual goal of serving as a minister of justice.  A wide variety 
of issues are implicated through any regime of public-private contracting: it 
allows local governments to be unresponsive and can create concerns 
regarding “inefficiency, conflict of interest, and abuse.”197  The prosecutor’s 
role, in its power and ubiquity in the criminal justice system, as well as its 
specific purpose of seeking justice rather than lowered crime rates, higher 
conviction rates, or higher revenue for public coffers, demands a different 
analysis that would be applied to other services procured through 
competitive bidding and RFPs. 
A.  THE DANGERS OF BIDDING: SELF-DEALING AND SELF-INTEREST 
Self-dealing has been defined in a public sector context as “[a] 
situation where one takes an action in an official capacity which involves 
dealing with oneself in a private capacity and confers a benefit on 
oneself.”198  Prosecutors, just as defense attorneys or other private sector 
attorneys, owe a fiduciary duty to their clients and must act in their best 
interests.199  The ABA Prosecution Standards attempt to clarify the question 
of who serves as the prosecutor’s client: prosecutors are to work “solely for 
the benefit of the client—the people—free of any compromising influences 
or loyalties.”200 
There are several factors that might make prosecutors more likely to 
act on improper self-interest and self-dealing under an RFP-based 
contracting system rather than the traditional model.  For one, prosecutors 
who have secured a position with a local government through the RFP 
 
196  Al Bilik, Privatization: Selling America to the Lowest Bidder, 1 LAB. RESEARCH 
REV. at 2 (1990). 
197  Epstein, supra note 21, at 2215. 
198  KENNETH KERNAGHAN & JOHN W. LANGFORD, THE RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC SERVANT 
142 (1990). 
199  Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The Prosecutor’s 
Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 563 (2005). 
200  ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 15, at Standard 3-1.3 cmt. 
1. ROMERO 4/21/2017  2:05 PM 
198 ROMERO [Vol. 107 
process have already subjected themselves to the competitive bidding 
process. In such situations, attorneys interested in the position will have 
already made some rudimentary calculations regarding the optimal 
compensation to request in an attempt to undercut competition and secure a 
contract, especially with the knowledge that efficiencies in cost are the 
overriding factor in determining to whom to award a prosecution 
contract.201 
Prosecutors hired on contract are also much more vulnerable to 
termination from their positions than elected prosecutors, or even those 
assistant prosecutors who are hired by an elected prosecutorial 
supervisor.202  The contractually outsourced prosecutor’s job has a natural 
“expiration date,” coupled with the additional weakness that the local 
government may cancel the contract, sometimes with the most minimal of 
notice.203  Elected, incumbent prosecutors, of course, have the luxury of 
waiting to be voted out of office (unless they have committed a rather 
egregious gaffe, in which case states have varying methods of removal204), 
while even assistant prosecutors, usually hired on as at will employees, may 
often benefit from other protections such as collective bargaining 
agreements or favorable employee policies and handbooks limiting the 
process of termination.205 
Financial pressures faced by contracted prosecutors may cause 
 
201  See Thayer, supra note 28, at 443 (explaining that inadequate low bids are inevitable 
whenever a competitive bidding system is used, and that the only force that can keep prices 
of such contracts from falling is some sort of outside intervention such a government price 
supports.”). 
202  Fairfax, supra note 12, at 444. 
203  See EPHRAIM CITY, UTAH, supra note 163, at 4. 
204  Some states have provisions for recall elections for those elected to public office, 
such as district attorneys.  See, e.g., L.A. County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, A Guide 
to Recall (Jul. 2010), https://www.lavote.net/documents/election_guides/GUIDE_TO_
RECALL.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2016); Or. Elections Div., Recall Manual (Jan. 2016), 
http://sos.oregon.gov/elections/Documents/RecallManual.pdf. 
 When appropriate, state bar associations may pursue ethics charges against attorneys, 
including district attorneys, which may result in disbarment.  For example, Michael Nifong, 
the former district attorney of Durham County, North Carolina, was disbarred by the North 
Carolina State Bar for “fraud, dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation; of making false 
statements of material fact before bar investigators, and of lying about withholding 
exculpatory DNA evidence, among other violations.”  Lara Setrakian & Chris Francescani, 
Former Duke Prosecutor Nifong Disbarred, ABC NEWS (June 16, 2007), http://abcnews.go.
com/TheLaw/story?id=3285862&page=1. 
205  See, e.g., King County Office of Labor Relations, King County Labor Contracts: 
Agreement By and Between King County and King County Prosecution Attorneys 
Association (Dec. 2014), http://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/depts/executive/labor-relation
s/documents/contracts/370C0114_scsg.ashx?la=en (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
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perverse incentives to, on the one hand, over-perform, and on the other, 
underperform.  Just as any other private service provider, prosecutors hired 
on contract will be “motivated to maximize profit.”206  The attorney who 
has advanced an hourly pay arrangement may have a greater tendency, 
conscious or not, to spend more time “padding” their hours on a prosecution 
job—in essence making every task take as long as possible. Conversely, 
attorneys working on flat fee per case or monthly retainer bases may 
become more lax in fulfilling their duties, doing as little as possible while 
getting paid as much as possible under the contract. Since government 
employees are not usually rewarded for cost-saving, some praise 
competitive bidding as a way to control costs by awarding contracts to 
those who would purportedly provide services more cheaply. Contracted 
prosecutors who are chosen because of their cost-saving measures, in 
reality, “might be even more motivated than government actors to provide 
low-quality service.”207 
It is important to acknowledge, however, that prosecutors hired on a 
more traditional at-will basis, such as deputy district attorneys and elected 
head prosecutors, also act according to personal motivations.208  An elected 
district attorney, just as prosecutors hired through a public bidding process, 
is subject to many of the same needs and pressures associated with life 
outside of the job (“e.g., putting food on the table or paying for their kids’ 
education”209).  In examining the distinctions and commonalities between 
employees and contractors, particularly in the contexts of prison 
privatization, Professor Alexander Volokh argued that there is, in essence, 
very little difference between the motivations of private firms and 
individual employees acting according to their private purposes, while 
challenging the assumption that firms only “act to maximize profit.”210  He 
also explained that, “it’s surely true that a firm only acts to maximize profit 
if some individual or individuals within the firm have taken such an 
action.”211  This is, however, precisely the task that prosecutors hired by 
way of RFP are expected to undertake from the time they apply for an open 
prosecutorial position, with RFPs stressing cost effectiveness and, 
implicitly, revenue generation above all else. 
 
206  Epstein, supra note 21, at 2235. 
207  Id. at 2243. 
208  Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction, 
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 179 (2012). 
209  Id. at 183. 
210  Id. 
211  Id. 
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B.  THE DANGERS OF BIDDING: MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS AND DIVIDED  
LOYALTIES 
Understandably, “prosecution outsourcing raises concerns about 
accountability and transparency.”212 Although there are widely 
acknowledged dangers that arise from relying on publicly elected 
prosecutors,213 such prosecutors at least wield a local government’s power 
against its citizens with the understanding that if such power is abused that 
their elected position may be in jeopardy, while also comporting with the 
longstanding prosecutorial norms described in Part II.B.  The outsourced, 
hired-on-contract prosecutor, however, is often much more shielded from 
public view.  Rather than having to seek approval from the public or, in the 
case of an assistant prosecutor, helping one’s elected supervisor secure wide 
public approval, the contract prosecutor only needs to perform for those 
who control renewal of the contract—usually a mayor, city council, county 
council, or city manager.214 
While these supervisory positions at the heads of local government 
usually are publicly elected, the public will almost certainly not pay the 
same attention to scrutinizing a prosecutor hired on contract as they might 
to one who has had to campaign and whom they elected themselves.215  
Under such circumstances, the contract prosecutor may feel a greater duty 
to those who make hiring decisions and to the local government itself rather 
than the real client to whom they owe a fiduciary duty and a duty of 
loyalty—the public.  A substantial conflict of interest is an inherent feature 
of a prosecutor’s function when hired by way of RFP.  No matter such a 
prosecutor’s actual intentions and motivations, he or she faces competing 
duties to the public, to the local government, and often to their own firms.216  
 
212  Fairfax, supra note 22, at 283. 
213  In particular, engaging in campaigning and relying on public support can politicize 
prosecutorial functions in such a manner as to force publicly elected prosecutors to approach 
their jobs ever mindful of future polls. 
214  Fairfax, supra note 12, at 443. 
215  The author does not mean to suggest that prosecutorial campaigns or elections are 
necessarily high- or fair-minded, nor does she intend to somehow fetishize the prosecutorial 
electoral process as being completely devoid of its own troubling problems.  See Stephanos 
Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
959, 961 (2009) (“District attorneys’ electoral contests are rarely measured assessments of a 
prosecutor’s overall performance. At best, campaign issues boil down to boasts about 
conviction rates, a few high-profile cases, and maybe a scandal.” (internal citation omitted)). 
216  “Public and private employees both have a duty to their employer.  But in the public 
sector, that duty runs all the way up to The People, whereas in the private sector, the 
employer itself (the corporation) has conflicting duties, one to its contractual partner (the 
government and the People) and a fiduciary duty to its shareholders (who want their profits 
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It is in such situations that a prosecutor may decide to make choices that 
serve to enrich and benefit a local government rather than the citizens it 
would purport to serve. 
A desire to serve the local government and its leaders may create even 
greater insidious incentives to either over or underperform.217  A classic 
example of over-performance is treating municipal and other misdemeanor 
and infraction courts as revenue generators for their respective municipal 
governments.218  Prosecutors may aggressively pursue fines that many 
would consider unfair or excessive while threatening jail for non-
payment.219  Along this vein, new categories of fines and fees appear to 
have been created for the sole purpose of raising revenue; some of these 
additional fines and fees may appear particularly outlandish, including 
those for probation supervision, jail “pay-for-stay” plans,220 and “public 
defender recoupment” fees.221  On the other hand is a complementary 
 
maximized).”  Volokh, supra note 208, at 185. 
217  It has been noted both in news media and in legal scholarship, especially since the 
Ferguson case, that criminal justice systems, especially on a local level, have been run very 
similarly to businesses.  See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
1723, 1733–34 (2015): 
Using law enforcement to raise revenue is part of a larger trend of thinking about government 
through the logic of business.  In the criminal context, critiques of privatization ha[ve] primarily 
focused on how these developments transfer state authority to private actors.  [No matter if a 
private actor is involved in a criminal case one can often see] a financial motive structured right 
into the immense discretion (on the part of police, prosecutors, or judicial officers) that runs law 
enforcement.  These actors then use their considerable discretion to shape not only the substance 
of criminal law but also its funding structure, in the way a legislature normally would.  Budget 
authorities have even started to cut police funding in response to these departments’ raising their 
own revenue, in turn spurring police to raise even more money in these ways. 
218  See, e.g., Aaron Falk & Mike Gorrell, Salt Lake County, Three Others on Track to 
Close Justice Courts, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 16, 2012, 5:04 pm), http://archive.sltrib.com/
story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/54498871-78/county-court-courts-justice.html.csp (discussing 
several Utah cities deciding to shutter their justice courts given the fall in filings and revenue 
steam); City of Bryan, Texas, Municipal Court, https://www.bryantx.gov/municipal-court/ 
(last visited May 20, 2016) (“The Court processes an average of about 20,000 cases a year.  
The Court also issues an average of about 5,500 warrants a year.  The Court collects more 
than $2 million in revenues for the City and State of Texas.”). 
219  See generally Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and 
Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753 (2010). 
220  This is a plan in which an inmate is charged for every day imprisoned in jail, then 
expected to pay some time after release.  Approximately seventy percent of states have 
authorized counties or other local governments to bill inmates in an attempt to recover costs 
of incarceration.  Leah A. Plunkett, Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 57, 57 (2013). See 
generally Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtor’s 
Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486 (2016). 
221  T. Ward Frampton, Comment, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury 
Trial Rates Vary State by State, 100 CAL. L. REV. 183, 208–12 (2012); Ronald F. Wright & 
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scenario that receives little, if any, attention. Prosecutors may feel pressured 
or even encouraged to pursue options requiring that a defendant pay a fine 
rather than argue for an outcome that would have been beneficial and more 
rooted in concerns for public safety and justice, such as drug and alcohol 
treatment or jail, but that would cost the jurisdiction money it does not have 
or is unwilling to spend.222 
Certainly an extreme example of rampant fine generating could be 
found during Stephanie Karr’s tenure as Ferguson City Prosecutor, which 
began in April of 2011, as well as that of the acting prosecutor who 
preceded her.  Since 2014, the City of Ferguson has become infamous; this 
has been in no small part due to “[c]ity, police, and court officials” with 
long working relationships, striving to “maximize revenue at every stage of 
the enforcement process.”223 Ms. Karr’s contract, unusual for such an 
arrangement, provided for compensation of $150.00 per billable hour, and 
Ms. Karr, along with deputy prosecutors from her law firm, made sure to 
keep themselves busy, essentially “padding” hours.224 Ms. Karr has also 
recommended disproportionately high fines for what could only be 
considered very minor offenses—$77 to $102 for an overgrown lawn, $102 
for parking fines—while providing a more proper-sounding reason for 
doing so (“large volume of non-compliance”) in an attempt to hide the fact 
that such recommendations were made in an effort to bring the city greater 
revenue.225 
The acting Ferguson prosecutor preceding Ms. Karr—who was also 
hired via contract—also advised law enforcement to allege every violation 
of law possible in every case in an effort to boost revenue generation226; he 
 
Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2046 (2006). 
222  Working briefly as a contract prosecutor for a small local government in Utah, the 
author encountered just such a case when prosecuting a defendant who had committed a 
DUI; the defendant pled guilty.  The author recommended that the defendant be sentenced to 
a weekend in jail to “dry out.”  The municipal court judge encouraged the author to ask for a 
large fine, instead.  After the author refused to do so, the judge still sentenced the defendant 
to a very large fine and no jail-time. 
223  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 10. 
224  “From 2014 to 2015, the amount prosecutors billed Ferguson rose from $30,260 to 
$61,605.  For work during the first three months of 2016, prosecutors charged Ferguson just 
over $30,000.  If that pace continues, prosecutors could cost the city more than $120,000 this 
year.”  Stephen Deere, Legal Bills Mount as Ferguson Stands by ‘Failure-to-Comply’ Cases, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 2, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/legal-bills-mount-as-ferguson-stands-by-failure-to-comply/article_2070be9f-99f1-521
8-9e3a-cdfaf4dfed5e.html. 
225  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 10. 
226  This included making sure that summonses for all “correct companion charges 
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also bragged about his effectiveness at acting as a collection agent for the 
city rather than as a minister of justice, stating in a 2011 report to the 
Ferguson City Council that he “denied defendants’ needless requests for 
continuance from the payment docket in an effort to aid in the court’s 
efficient collection of its fines.”227  Even after federal investigations that 
took place following Michael Brown’s death concluded that Ferguson’s 
criminal justice system both suffered from systemic racial bias and 
functioned as a revenue-generating scheme, Ms. Karr continued on in her 
position, even prosecuting and exacting fines from those protesting the 
shooting of Michael Brown in 2014 well after the resignations of the 
Ferguson Municipal Judge, Chief of Police, and City Manager.228 
Ferguson’s local criminal justice system and its catastrophic failures 
demonstrate, perhaps, the worst-case scenario when every organ of the 
criminal adjudicatory process: law enforcement, the judge, and the 
prosecutor, work in concert to make courts a source of revenue. As 
ministers of justice, prosecutors should be in the vanguard to fight against 
such injustices. 
C.  THE DANGERS OF BIDDING: BLAME SHIFTING AND LACK OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The hiring of prosecutors through a public bidding process also allows 
local governments an undue ability to shield themselves from accountability 
for a prosecutor’s actions, and disincentivizes them from seeking to provide 
good service.  If a hypothetical municipal prosecutor was revealed to be 
unsuited to the job by way of temperament (perhaps the prosecutor 
performs poorly in court) or ethical and philosophical approach to the job 
(the prosecutor engages in an abundance of Brady violations or some other 
problematic behavior), local governments who have hired such a prosecutor 
have a much greater ability to point to their hiring process and the 
requirement of accepting a low bid as the source of the mistake rather than 
having to take on the same accountability when more directly making such 
a choice, such as by appointing an attorney to the position while offering a 
figure up front during salary negotiations.229  This disconnection of mayors 
 
[were] being issued, such as speeding, failure to maintain a single lane, no insurance, and no 
seat belt, etc.”  Id. at 11. 
227  Id. at 14. 
228  Mariah Stewart & Ryan J. Reilly, Ferguson Prosecutor Accused of Misconduct is 
Still Crusading Against Ferguson Arrestees, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2015), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/stephanie-karr-ferguson_n_7707802. 
229  See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
581, 589 (2009). Elected prosecutors are held accountable through the political process, 
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and local government councils from the prosecutors they happen to procure 
through bidding also introduces an unacceptable risk of lack of oversight in 
prosecutorial standards.230 
This dodging of responsibility can be observed in different industries 
in which outsourcing and competitive bidding predominate.231  A 
particularly spectacular example of a failure in outsourcing and corporate 
responsibility is the recent Boeing 787 production debacle.  The 787 
Dreamliner was due for completion, maiden flight, and delivery in 2008.  
The first delivery, to All Nippon Airways, occurred on September 25, 
2011.232  This massive delay was blamed on a number of factors, including 
 
while prosecutors who are appointed are subject to myriad ways in which they may be 
terminated their position, with such diversity understandable given the number of unique 
local governments. Id. Given the lack of data collected on the subject it is difficult to 
ascertain at this juncture how many unelected prosecutors are hired by way of competitive 
bidding versus those who are merely appointed to their positions. 
230  See generally Sanford C. Gordon and Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the 
Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334 (2002). 
231  Other examples abound, especially in information technology (IT). In late 2007, 
Queensland, Australia outsourced its health department payroll to IBM, which then bungled 
the project leading to thousands of employees either not getting paid or getting drastically 
overpaid, as well as a cost overrun 16,000 percent above projected cost. See Queensland 
Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry, Report (July 31, 2013), http://www.health
payrollinquiry.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/207203/Queensland-Health-Payroll-
System-Commission-of-Inquiry-Report-31-July-2013.pdf. In 2004, J.P. Morgan Chase & 
Co. cancelled a seven-year contract with IBM signed in 2002 after determining that it could 
handle its IT better in-house. Stacy Cowley, J.P. Morgan Scraps $5B IT Deal with IBM, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Sep. 20, 2004), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2567074/it-out
sourcing/j-p—morgan-scraps—5b-it-deal-with-ibm.html. 
 In 2010 a massive systems failure at Navitaire, which provided Virgin Blue’s airline 
reservation system, disrupted travel for 50,000 customers, with Virgin Blue immediately 
blaming Navitaire for the issue in a press release. Michael Krigsman, Cloud-based IT 
Failure Halts Virgin Flights, ZDNET (Sep. 27, 2010, 2:38pm), http://www.zdnet.com/
article/cloud-based-it-failure-halts-virgin-flights/. 
 In the summer of 2012, a software update left millions of Royal Bank of Scotland, 
NatWest, and Ulster Bank customers unable to access their funds. Robert Peston, Is 
Outsourcing the Cause of RBS Debacle?, BBC NEWS (June 25, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/
news/business-18577109. 
As [Robert Peston] underst[ood] it, one reason why RBS has not given much detailed 
information about why its services have been so badly disrupted is that so much of the 
operational responsibility for IT is outsourced—so there is a sensitive issue of where to attribute 
the blame. In [his] conversations with RBS bankers, there is an implication that outsourcing 
contributed to the problems. 
Id. 
232  Boeing, ANA Complete Contractual Delivery of First 787 Dreamliner, BOEING 
MEDIAROOM (Sept. 25, 2011), http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2011-09-25-Boeing-ANA-
Complete-Contractual-Delivery-of-First-787-Dreamliner. 
1. ROMERO 4/21/2017  2:05 PM 
2017]  PROFIT-DRIVEN PROSECUTION 205 
Boeing’s rampant outsourcing and the resultant lack of supervision and 
accountability.233  Even after delivery of the 787 to varying airlines, the 
aircraft suffered from a variety of defects, including electrical and battery 
system flaws, fuel leaks, cracked windshields, and brake problems, leading 
carriers over the world to ground the 787 in 2013, the first “regulatory 
grounding of an entire fleet . . . since 1979.”234  Production of the 787 had 
also gone over budget by several billions of dollars.235 
The ability of a principal to avoid accountability or political fall-out 
for problems arising from placing prosecution services up for competitive 
bidding is rather similar.  A mayor or local government council can more 
easily foist any blame or political damage on a prosecutor under such an 
arrangement.236  Prosecutors hired through a competitive bidding process 
may attempt to do the same: “When problems arise, government officials 
and private contractors can point fingers at each other, leaving the public 
with little means of knowing who is really at fault.”237  Try as many may, 
justice, fairness, and public confidence in officials are not things that can or 
should be quantified or balanced against any other savings that can be 
measured in dollars. 
D.  ILLUSORY PROBLEMS OF OUTSOURCED PROSECUTION 
Although relying on a contract model for prosecution services 
increases the risks mentioned above, other concerns that have been 
previously addressed are not the serious evils some would believe them to 
be.  Underperformance of a different sort than that discussed above has 
troubled some: “The demands of the contractor’s private matters could 
monopolize the attorney’s time, leaving the criminal prosecution matters 
without the appropriate focus and attention.”238  Especially in the context of 
 
233  Dominic Gates, Boeing 787’s Problems Blamed on Outsourcing, Lack of Oversight, 
SEATTLE TIMES (May 1, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-787rsquos-
problems-blamed-on-outsourcing-lack-of-oversight/; Michael Hiltzik, 787 Dreamliner 
Teaches Boeing Costly Lesson on Outsourcing, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2011), http://articles.
latimes.com/2011/feb/15/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20110215; J. Lynn Lunsford, Outsourcing at 
Crux of Boeing Strike, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB122083149762108451. 
234  Steve Denning, The Boeing Debacle: Seven Lessons Every CEO Must Learn, FORBES 
(Jan. 17, 2013, 10:24 am), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/01/17/the-boeing
-debacle-seven-lessons-every-ceo-must-learn/#70368733744f. 
235  Hiltzik, supra note 233. 
236  Epstein, supra note 21, at 2242. 
237  Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and 
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1210 (2000). 
238  Fairfax, supra note 22, at 284–85. 
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small jurisdiction contract prosecutors on which this Article focuses, it is 
quite unlikely that attorneys will be dividing their attention between any 
sort of high power, national or international private practice with an 
additional local prosecutor job as a supplement to that practice. In those 
situations, where an attorney may need to meet a minimum number of 
billable hours as mandated by a firm, it would be unlikely that such an 
attorney would need (let alone want) to undertake part-time contract 
prosecution. 
Both the ABA and National Prosecution Standards anticipate severe 
conflict of interest traps when criminal prosecutions are outsourced.  In 
prescribing full-time prosecutors over part-time ones who have been hired 
by contract, the National Prosecution Standards explain that no prosecutor 
should “engage in professional conduct that is inconsistent with the need for 
prosecutorial independence.”239 The ABA Prosecution Standards exhort 
prosecutors to “not be involved in the prosecution of a former client.”240  
There also exists in some trepidation that contract and/or part-time 
prosecutors may prosecute former clients (and potentially be overly lenient 
with criminals who need harsher treatment, presumably), or that such 
prosecutors may try to use information gained during a prosecution or 
investigation against other actors when practicing civilly in an improper 
way while trying to derive some sort of advantage.241 
The practical reality that the ABA and NDAA Prosecution Standards, 
as well as legal scholars, have seemed to ignore is that the danger of 
conflicts of interest involving the prosecution of either current or past 
clients is overstated.  In those jurisdictions small enough that hiring one 
full-time prosecutor is impossible, or, even the case of affluent small 
communities in which hiring one full-time or multiple prosecutors is not 
deemed necessary, every attorney and any resident with involvement with 
the courts will know who the prosecutor has previously represented or 
whether the prosecutor is attempting to improperly utilize superior 
knowledge.242  These communities are able to a greater degree to 
police themselves in an effort to avoid any of the more traditional conflicts 
 
239  NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 90, at Standard 1-1.3. 
240  ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 15, at Standard 3-1.7. 
241  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2016). This sort of behavior is 
also traditionally prohibited by ethical rules that have been adopted throughout the country 
Fairfax, supra note 12, at 438–41. 
242  See Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in 
the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 125 (2003) (discussing and 
describing small jurisdiction practice as “living in a fishbowl”). 
1. ROMERO 4/21/2017  2:05 PM 
2017]  PROFIT-DRIVEN PROSECUTION 207 
of interest that may arise for a prosecutor in a larger market.243 
E.  COMPARISONS WITH OTHER RFP PROCESSES 
Local governments fulfill many of their needs for both goods and 
services by way of competitive bidding processes,244 and, as such, it may 
seem that if certain service needs may be fulfilled by a such a procurement 
process, then prosecution should be no different.  The fact that prosecutors, 
however, provide a uniquely important public service that should not be 
subject to competitive bidding, however, becomes clearer when comparing 
such prosecutorial outsourcing with competitive bidding in two other 
criminal justice functions—the construction and operation of private 
prisons and the hiring of public defenders. 
1. Bidding for Prosecutorial Services versus Private Prisons 
One useful reference point for thinking about the risks of outsourcing 
prosecution is the privatization of prisons.  The growth of privatized prisons 
has been astronomical in the past few decades: “In 1999 private prison 
contracts existed in 31 states.  That figure grew to 33 states by 2004, before 
declining to 30 by 2010.”245  Contracts for the building and operation of 
private prisons are usually granted to an applicant after a similar public 
bidding process as that examined thus far in this Article, offering a useful 
comparative analogy from a different sector of the criminal justice 
system.246  Privatization of prisons has been advocated for the same reasons 
as privatizing many other government and public services—cost savings, 
superior quality for greater value, and job generation have all been 
advanced as reasons for the bidding and outsourcing of both construction 
 
243  See, e.g., Utah v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 856–57 (Utah 1992). In an example 
geographically close to home for the author, the Utah Supreme Court decided that the “vital 
interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized when a city prosecutor is appointed to 
assist in the defense of an accused.  Consequently, we hold that as a matter of public 
policy . . . counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend 
indigent persons.” 
244  See, e.g., Kenneth M. Roberts & Nancy C. Smith, Design-Build Contracts Under 
State and Local Procurement Laws, 25 PUB. CONT. L. J. 645, 648–97 (providing a state-by-
state analysis showing a proliferation of competitive bidding requirements in the 
construction arena). 
245  Cody Mason, The Sentencing Project, Too Good to be True: Private Prisons in 
America (Jan. 2012), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Too-Good-to-
be-True-Private-Prisons-in-America.pdf. 
246  See Lauren Galik, et al., Annual Privatization Report 2014: Criminal Justice and 
Corrections, REASON (June 2014), http://reason.org/files/apr-2014-criminal-justice.pdf. 
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and operation of private prisons.247  Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, 
unique issues arise with the privatization of prisons; it is often difficult to 
maintain “all the services necessary to maintain[] safety in prisons” as the 
“services that receive comparatively less funding in order to contain costs” 
are both “personnel and programs.”248  Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA) made it clear in their 2010 Annual Report that their main goal is 
profit-making and cost savings: 
Our growth is generally dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to develop 
and manage new correction and detention facilities.  This possible growth depends on 
a number of factors we cannot control, including crime rates and sentencing patterns 
in various jurisdictions and acceptance of privatization.  The demand for our facilities 
and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts, 
leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or through the 
decriminalization of certain activities that are currently proscribed by our criminal 
laws.249 
Although prosecutors competing for contracts and CCA (and, presumably, 
other firms in the privatized prison trade) may not seem alike on their 
surfaces, both are subject to some of the same vicissitudes effecting their 
abilities to secure business for themselves, such as crime rates, appetites for 
the bidding and privatization processes in different jurisdictions, and 
stringency in law enforcement not just on the policing side but also the 
drafting and amending of criminal codes to be either more lax or more 
restrictive. 
Private prison contractors such as CCA and the GEO Group, however, 
are engaged to provide services whose aspects are quantifiable and, as such, 
possible to evaluate.250  There are often concrete standards that such 
companies are expected to meet, including staffing requirements,251 
 
247  See Adrian Moore, Private Prisons: Quality Corrections at a Lower Cost, REASON 
(April 1998), at 10–15, 23–29, http://reason.org/files/d14ffa18290a9aeb969d1a6c1a9ff935.
pdf. 
248  Mason, supra note 245, at 10. 
249  Id. at 12 (internal quotations omitted). 
250  Information on private prisons, however, is becoming more difficult to obtain.  Rep. 
Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas introduced for the sixth time the proposed Private Prison 
Information Act of 2015, which endeavored to have records regarding private prison 
operations subject to FOIA in the same manner as records maintained by any other federal 
agency.  See H.R. 2740, 114th Congress (2015). The bill was referred to the Crime, 
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee on June 16, 2015, and had 
not seen any progress since.  See All Bill Information (Except Text) for H.R.2470 – Private 
Prison Information Act of 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-
bill/2470/all-info (last visited July 21, 2016). 
251  Forrest Wilder, World’s Largest For-Profit Prison Blasted in Federal Audit, TEX. 
OBSERVER (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.texasobserver.org/worlds-largest-for-profit-prison-
1. ROMERO 4/21/2017  2:05 PM 
2017]  PROFIT-DRIVEN PROSECUTION 209 
maintenance of facilities and equipment,252 food service protocols,253 square 
footage depending on the type of room and its proposed occupancy.254 
Prosecutors, on the other hand, are charged, as has been discussed 
throughout this Article, with a special “duty to do justice,” a duty which can 
best be described as—employing Professor Bruce Green’s words—”protean 
as well as vague.”255  “Unfortunately, the worth of justice cannot be 
accurately quantified.”256 Justice is a concept and ideal that cannot survive 
quantification; attempts to do so would provide results and measurements 
for different concepts altogether, such as crime or conviction rates.257  It is 
precisely due to the unquantifiability and ineffable character of “justice” 
that its minister should not be put up for competitive bid by any level of 
government, local or otherwise, to be auctioned off to the lowest bidder.  
Given the nature of justice, it becomes all the more incumbent on a 
prosecutor to not put themselves in situations, including securing 
employment by way of public bidding, that may call their motives to 
question. 
On a more practical level, it is exceptionally difficult to evaluate uses 
of prosecutorial discretion in an objective fashion as one might the 
performance of a private prison operator.  The important roles and duties of 
a prosecutor also demand that applicants inherently have some disposition 
to doing justice on behalf of the clients—in this case, the public.  Although 
a very unlikely scenario given that attorneys preferred to be paid, even 
nominally, for the work they do, throwing open the hiring process through a 
 
blasted-in-federal-audit/ (discussing a private prison company’s violation of staffing 
requirements set by the federal Bureau of Prisons). 
252  Caroline Isaacs, AFSC White Paper: Private, For-Profit Prisons in Arizona,  
at 2 (2015) https://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/sites/default/files/content/products/AFSC.pdf 
(discussing security failure related to equipment and facilities maintenance problems, such as 
“malfunctioning cameras, doors, and alarms; holes under fences; [and] broken perimeter 
lights and cameras”). 
253  OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., FULL INTERNAL MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF THE LAKE 
ERIE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 8 (2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/downloads/
2012/10/prison-audit-report.pdf (listing food service concerns such as not taking food 
product temperatures regularly, lack of proper sanitizing of pots and pans, and a lack of extra 
clean clothing that was supposed to be provided to inmate food service workers). 
254  See 501 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 3:050. 
255  Green, supra note 60, at 608. 
256  Thomas E. Bilek, Accountants’ Liability to the Third Party and Public Policy: A 
Calabresi Approach, 39 SW. L. J. 689, 702 (1985). 
257  “[J]ustice and mercy both have roles in the criminal justice system; mercy cannot be 
precisely quantified and institutionalized or it ceases to be mercy and becomes leniency; 
mercy is the trump that can capture equality’s ace and allow punishment at the bottom range 
of a deserved punishment.” NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 180 (1982). 
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public bidding and RFP process could hypothetically lead to candidates 
attempting to purchase the ability to “do justice” and serve as a prosecutor 
from a local government.  Again, although unlikely, nothing in the RFPs 
reviewed (and one may venture to guess that no RFPs currently existing) 
explicitly prevents an applicant from attempting to pay a local government 
for the privilege of serving as a local prosecutor.  The caliber of a candidate 
would certainly be suspect in such a situation; the applicant willing to not 
only underbid but either work pro bono or to pay for such a position would 
almost certainly be doing so for political clout, for the sheer enjoyment of 
prosecuting individuals and exerting the government’s power over 
defendants, or for some other ignoble purpose.258 
2. Bidding for Prosecutorial Services vs. Indigent Defense 
Another important reference point for evaluating the risks of 
contracting out prosecutorial services is the competitive bidding of our 
indigent defense259 services.  Providing for indigent defense services, much 
like prosecution services, is also difficult for small local governments, 
especially those located in nonmetropolitan areas.260  Given that public 
defense would seem to be the other side of a coin shared with the 
prosecution function, one may initially believe that all of the same problems 
exist for public defender positions that are contracted out after an 
RFP/bidding process as for contracting out prosecution.  The roles of the 
defense attorney versus the prosecutor, however, affect the analysis of 
which, if any, actors in the criminal justice system at a local level should be 
hired by way of RFP. 
Defense attorneys, for a variety of reasons, may be seen as being held 
to a much lower aspirational bar than that imposed on the prosecution 
function. First, rather than representing the public or effectuating “justice,” 
 
258  Harvard Law School, Clinical Program, http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/clinical/clinics/ 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2016); University of Virginia School of Law, Prosecution Clinic, 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/academics/practical/prosecutionclinic.htm (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2016). Students participating in such clinics, however, often receive experience that 
will boost their chances of employment after law school, as well as credits that may be 
applied toward graduation, and, as such, students participating in prosecution clinics are not 
providing free services at all. Id. 
259  For purposes of this paper, indigent defense refers broadly to publicly funded 
criminal defense counsel, including those operating outside of the more familiar public 
defender office model. 
260  See David Paul Cullen, Indigent Defense Comparison of Ad Hoc and Contract 
Defense in Five Semi-Rural Jurisdictions, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 311 (1992); Margaret 
H. Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808 (2000); Pruitt and Colgan, supra note 110. 
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a defense attorney’s loyalty and fiduciary duty run to his client and his 
client alone.261  Second, while it has been held that the “right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel,”262 it is particularly difficult, 
if not nearly impossible, to make the requisite showing necessary to 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel.263 Though defense attorney 
performance is to be assessed using an “objective standard of 
reasonableness,” courts are “highly deferential” when reviewing a defense 
attorney’s performance.264 Strategic choices by defense counsel are 
“virtually unchallengeable,” including “reasonable decision[s] that make[] 
particular investigations unnecessary.”265 Any defendant attempting to 
make a showing that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”266 
As elucidated by Strickland and its progeny, the burden on a defendant 
seeking to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel is, in most 
circumstances, insurmountably high. Conversely, the standard for sufficient 
defense attorney performance is very low, for good or ill: the only legal 
concern when putting public defense contracts up for bid is hiring an 
attorney who can surpass the low standard set for “effectiveness.”267  On the 
other hand, however, this low bar is a bar that has been more firmly defined 
than a prosecutor’s duty to “seek justice.”  This Article certainly does not 
advocate that the public defense bar should seek only to meet its rather low 
minimal obligations to clients; it does, however, argue that public defenders 
 
261  “Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel’s 
function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (citing 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980)). 
262  McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
263  There are two factors to consider when attempting to establish ineffective assistance 
of counsel: 1) deficient performance, and 2) the deficient performance resulting in prejudice 
serious enough to bring the outcome of the proceeding into question.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687. 
264  Id. at 688–89. 
265  Id. at 691. 
266  Id. at 694. 
267  Public defenders hired on a contractual basis by way of RFP may, however, feel 
some similar economic pressures and incentives as prosecutors, including overbilling when 
hired on an hourly basis, and underperforming so as not to run over any set budgets set by 
the local governments that have contracted with them. Kelly A. Hardy, Contracting for 
Indigent Defense: Providing Another Forum for Skeptics to Question Attorney’s Ethics, 80 
MARQ. L. REV. 1053, 1075–76 (1997). 
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have clear, articulable standards to follow by which their performance may 
be more easily assessed and for which they must be accountable, in contrast 
to the vague but important goal to “do justice” incumbent upon a 
prosecutor. In this sense, public defenders have a more objective standard 
by which to judge themselves, and procurement of their services by way of 
RFP and competitive bidding is not nearly as problematic. 
CONCLUSION 
Although most contract prosecutors hired through an RFP and 
competitive bidding process likely believe themselves to be devoid of any 
form of destructive tendency to over or underperform, contracting out for 
prosecution services, especially as a method for saving resources rather than 
hiring a prosecutor on a salaried basis, should be abandoned. This Article 
demonstrates that incentives for prosecutors to engage in self-interested 
behavior by under or over-performing while engaging in revenue 
generation, as well as the incentives for local governments to prioritize 
profit-driven prosecution, are too great.  Apart from the perverse incentives 
that operate upon prosecutors and local governments when employing 
competitive bidding and RFPs in prosecution service procurement, the 
public is also deprived of a prosecutor who exemplifies long-standing 
prosecutorial norms: 1) a government employee, 2) who devotes all of her 
time and professional energies to criminal prosecution, and 3) tries to 
somehow do or effect some vague notion of justice. 
This Article is the first of its kind to examine the pitfalls of employing 
RFPs on the local and municipal prosecutor level.  Although the problems 
that arise from this process may initially seem far removed to many, 
especially those living in large cities, with greater budget shortfalls and 
pushes for devolution of governmental responsibilities to local governments 
occurring nationwide, the problems described in this Article are very likely 
to spread.  Further investigation into potential interventions on local 
government levels will be necessary to stanch and prevent this increase. 
 
 
